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Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles:   
Germany and the United States Contrasted 
Part 1.  Introduction.1  Germany’s Basic Law2 assigns primary jurisdiction over 
constitutional issues3 to Germany’s Constitutional Court4 and requires other courts to 
suspend their proceedings and refer constitutional issues that are critical to resolution of 
any pending case to the Constitutional Court.5  In the United States, the Supreme Court 
has broad appellate and, in some cases, original jurisdiction6 and its authority to review 
legislative action for conflict with the Constitution became clear early in the Court’s 
history.7  Unlike Germany, however, lower courts also have jurisdiction to decide 
constitutional issues, subject of course to eventual Supreme Court review.8
1 The tax law report for the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law scheduled 
for July 2006 complements this article and provide a broader comparative review of constitutional tax law.  
The author of this article and general reporter for the tax program for the Congress designed the congress 
topic:  Restricting the Legislative Power to Tax:  Intersections of Taxation and Constitutional Law.  
(Program available at http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/index1.asp).  For the national report from the 
United States that addresses some of the issues this article raises, see Tracy Kaye and Stephen Mazza, 
Restricting the Legislative Power to Tax,     Am. J. of Comparative Law    (2005). 
2 Das Grundgesetz in German.  The term “Basic Law” tends to alternate with “Constitution” in the 
literature. The Basic Law serves the functions in Germany of the Constitution in the United States with the 
material difference that the procedure for amending the Basic Law is simpler than the emendation 
procedure for the U.S. Constitution.  Compare Art 79 of the Basic Law that requires a two-thirds majority 
in each house of parliament to change the Basic Law with the US procedure under Article 5 of the U.S. 
Constitution requiring ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures (or the electorates of three-
fourths of the states).  On the other hand, the Basic Law permits no amendments to Articles 1-20 that 
describe the basic rights although clarification and embellishment is permissible.  Art. 146 anticipates that 
Germany eventually will adopt a constitution that will replace the Basic Law.  Except as noted to the 
contrary, the English language text of quotations is from Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Christian Tomuschat & David Curry, 
trans) (1998). 
3 Art. 93 of the Basic Law also gives the constitutional court authority to resolve conflicts between federal 
and state law and between the laws of different states. 
4 Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in German.  While the German Constitutional Court publishes its 
decisions, it does not disclose the names of the parties to the case as U.S. decisions do.  Hence, German 
decisions become known by their citations or by some characteristic of the case.  Customary citation form 
in Germany that this Article follows is “BVerfGE” (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court) 
followed by a volume number and a page number. 
5 Art 100 establishes the referral process and requires the court involved to suspend the proceedings until 
the federal constitutional court resolves the constitutional issue.  The Basic Law requires referral only if the 
constitutional issue is critical to the outcome of the case. 
6 U.S. Constitution Art. III, Sec. 2. 
7 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court’s power to review 
legislative acts for constitutionality).   
8 Rules of the United States Supreme Court, Rule 10 (2005) provides discretionary Supreme Court review 
of a decision of a U.S. Court of Appeals or the highest court of any state by writ of certiorari. 
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 While the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved many tax controversies,9 with 
taxpayers raising constitutional questions in a number of cases addressing questions of 
federal tax law,10 only infrequently has the Court found a federal taxing statute to violate 
a constitutionally protected right or privilege.11  Rarely has the Supreme Court looked to 
the Constitution and decided that a federal tax law violated the Constitution.12  Never has 
the Supreme Court held a federal tax law to conflict with the Bill of Rights.13  Many 
more decisions involve challenges to state tax statutes as in conflict with the U.S. 
Constitution.14  Often those state law cases combine claims under several provisions of 
the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause,15 Due Process, 16 and Equal 
Protection.17  In reviewing state tax statutes for compliance with constitutional standards, 
the Court consistently has applied its rational basis test, its least intrusive standard of 
review.18  Under that test, a statute is valid so long as the legislature has a rational basis 
9 A recently assembled database identifies xxx Supreme Court decisions in federal tax matters during the 
years 1913 – 2000.  Nancy Staudt and Peter Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database (soon to be 
published on http://law.wustl.edu).  The overall database seeks to identify all Supreme Court decisions 
addressing federal taxes during the years 1913 – 2000 and omits decisions addressing state taxes.  
10 Id (identifying 157 decisions in which the Court addressed Constitutional questions in resolving the 
federal tax issue.  I am grateful to professors Staudt and Wiedenbeck for making the constitutional 
decisions’ portion of the database available to me to use in this project.  The total number of decisions is 
somewhat greater than 157, as the version of the database I used missed a few cases, including those cited 
in notes 152 and 153 infra.  See discussion infra in Part 3.   
11 Id.  The database discloses only 17 decisions in which the taxpayer won (some only partially) and several 
of those cases were criminal cases involving the issue of self-incrimination. 
12 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (determining that the 16th Amendment permits Congress to tax 
only realized gain); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (limiting retroactive application of the estate 
tax on foreseeability grounds). 
13 Amendments 1 through 9 of the U.S. Constitution protecting certain basic rights and individual liberties 
including freedom of speech, assembly and religion.  On the history of the Bill of Rights generally, see 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991). 
14 No one has compiled a database of these decisions so there number is less certain than for decisions 
involving federal taxing statutes. 
15 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power “To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, …”  Implicit in the grant of power 
to the federal government is the denial to the states of the power to burden interstate commerce, through 
discriminatory taxation, for example.  Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2005). 
16 U.S. Constitution Amendment 5.  The Due Process Clause reads in part:  “No person shall … be deprived 
of … property, without due process of law….”  U.S. Const. Amend. 14 applies the requirement of “due 
process” to the states:  “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process or law.” 
17 U.S. Const. Amend. 14. last clause.  The Equal Protection Clause reads in part:  “nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  The Equal Protection clause is not part of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Supreme Court has held that it does not apply to the United States.  Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (upholding the Constitutionality of the Social Security Act).  The 
courts have determined that the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment must be read into the 5th
Amendment, supra note 16 (quoting the relevant part) so that the provision applies to the United States as 
well as the states.  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (dictum stating that equal 
protection analysis under the 5th Amendment to be the same as under the 14th Amendment). 
18 See discussion infra in Part 3B.  
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for its enactment.19  The decisions predominantly uphold the state taxing statute.  
Occasionally, the Court limits states’ taxing power20 or their tax collection authority over 
non-residents.21
 The German Constitutional Court, on the other hand, has rendered many decisions 
in tax controversies on constitutional grounds.22  Those constitutional tax decisions have 
played and continue to play a meaningful and ongoing role in shaping tax law and 
administration in Germany.23  The Constitutional Court employs a more exacting 
standard of review than rational basis and requires a compelling justification for 
legislation that results in any distributional inequalities causing like taxpayers to pay 
unequal amounts of tax.24  In Germany, constitutional protections of individual liberties 
have rendered unconstitutional such matters as mandatory joint assessment of married 
couples,25 retroactive application of rate increases,26 deductibility of political 
contributions,27 value-based taxes that do not apply the same valuation standard to all 
properties,28 and income taxation of the subsistence minimum,29 and, quite recently, a tax 
that the government was unable in practice to assess and collect uniformly.30
19 Western and Southern Life Insurance Company v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 
648 (1981) (holding a retaliatory state tax to be rationally related to the state’s proper objectives).  See 
discussion infra in text accompanying note 259. 
20 Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) 
(prohibiting non-uniform assessment of tax on real property); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of camp for non-residents of state while 
exempting real estate of camps for residents). 
21 National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (limiting the state’s power to 
impose collection responsibility for use taxes on non-resident vendors with no substantial presence in the 
state). 
22 A database similar to the Staudt and Wiedenbeck database, supra note 9, is not available for the German 
decisions.  However, the website for the university library at Marburg, http://www.ub.uni-
marburg.de/fachinfo/infjur03.html, discloses that there is a looseleafed, reference work for the decisions of 
the German Constitutional Court, NACHSCHLAGEWERK DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS. 
23 Decisions of Constitutional Court, however, have had little impact upon the structure and administration 
of the turnover tax (Umsatzsteuer) in Germany although the federal government raises roughly one-half of 
all its tax revenue through the value added tax.  See, Bundesreferat I A 6, ERGEBNIS DER 122. SITZUNG DES 
ARBEITSKREISES “STEUERSCHÄTZUNGEN” VOM-4. BIS 6.-NOVEMBER-2003 IN FRANKFURT for statistics on 
distribution of collections.  The turnover tax is substantially the same as a value added tax.  This Article 
addresses the absence of constitutional decisions concerning the value added tax infra in Part 4F infra. 
24 BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), discussed infra in part 4B. 
25 Id.  
26 BVerfGE 13, 261, 271 (Dec. 19, 1961, 2d Senate), BVerfGE 13, 274 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate) 
and BVerfGE 13, 279 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate). 
27 BVerfGE 6, 273 (February 21, 1957) and BVerfGE 8, 51 (June 24, 1958). 
28 BVerfGE 93, 121 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senate) (holding the wealth tax, as applied to violate the equality 
principle); BVerfGE 93, 165 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senate) (likewise the inheritance tax), discussed infra in 
Part 4E. 
29 BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990), discussed infra in part 4A. 
30 BVerfGE 110, 94 (March 9, 2004, 2d Senate), discussed infra in part 4C. 
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 While the provisions protecting individual liberties and relationships are more 
extensive and detailed in the German constitution31 than in the United States 
constitution,32 that distinction may be one without a material difference.  Both 
constitutions protect substantially identical groups of human rights, including speech, 
assembly, religion, personal dignity, racial equality and so forth.33  Yet, the United States 
constitution has played at best an incidental and only indirect role in the development of 
U.S. tax law.34
 This Article explores how the German Constitutional Court and the United States 
Supreme Court approach constitutionally based arguments in their tax decisions.  The 
Article focuses its attention primarily on distributional fairness in taxation.  Most cases 
involving fairness issues address the equal rights guarantees in Germany35 and the 
corresponding equal protection under U.S. law36 or apply the rule of law provision of the 
German constitution37 corresponding to the due process concept in the U.S.38  The article 
seeks to develop hypotheses to account for the differences in approach and outcome in 
the two courts.39
Part 2 of the Article introduces the basic tax equality concepts of horizontal and 
vertical equity and, in providing a brief overview comparing German and U.S. taxing 
structures, observes that neither system protects vertical equity (although Germany 
compensates in part for regressivity through its protected subsistence minima).40  Part 3 
examines the U.S cases that address or resolve constitutional arguments under the U.S. 
Constitution.  Part 3 emphasizes tax decisions applying the Bill of Rights and the 
31 Art. 1-12, 13 –17, and 20 describe and guarantee certain basic rights and liberties and include the 
protections found in the Bill of Rights, Amendments 1-9 of the U.S. Constitution.   
32 Amendments 1-9. 13-15  to the U.S. Constitution. 
33 Art. 3 of the Basic Law guarantees equal rights without regard to sex in Germany.  The U.S. constitution 
provides no similar protection but statutes and court decisions do.  While a proposed amendment to the 
U.S. constitution failed to gather the approval of sufficient states to make it part of the constitution, U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions have applied equal protection analysis in striking down statutes that discriminated 
against women, for example, Frontiero v Richardson, 417 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that requiring service 
women to establish their husband’s dependency but not requiring husband’s to do so with respect to their 
wives was unconstitutional), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding that the Social 
Security Act discriminated against women who left surviving husbands and dependent children). 
34 See, generally, Boris I. Bittker and Martin J. McMahon, Jr., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS ¶1.1 (1988). 
35 Article 3 of the Basic Law. 
36 U.S. Const. Amend. 14, Section 1.  This amendment by its terms does not apply to the federal 
government but only to the states.  Nevertheless, the courts have applied the equal protection principle to 
the federal government as well, supra note 17.  William B. Lockhart et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES—
COMMENTS—QUESTIONS at 1202 (1991). 
37 The principle of the rule of law (das Rechtstaatprinzip) flows from Art. 20 of the Basic Law:  “[t]he 
Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.  (Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist 
ein demokratischer und sozialer Bundesstaat.) 
38 U.S. Const. Amend. V and as applied to the states through Amendment 14, Section 1. 
39 Victor Thuronyi, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW  64-100 (The Hague 2003) (“Thuronyi” in the following) lays 
a foundation for comparative constitutional law study of taxation and discusses briefly the major German 
and U.S. cases.  
40 See discussion infra Part 4A.   
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Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.  Part 3A describes a few taxpayer successes 
in non-Bill of Rights cases.  Part 3B highlights how the Supreme Court rejects taxpayers’ 
claims under the Bill of Rights in federal tax cases.  Part 3C turns to taxpayers’ 
challenges to state tax laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Part 3D complements the 
discussion of the Equal Protection cases in Part 3C with some of the Supreme Court’s 
Commerce Clause decisions where the Court tends toward a stricter equality standard.  
Part 3E reviews issues relating to the federal government’s power to tax state activity and 
vice versa.  A brief Part 3F glances at the screening process by which the Court insulates 
itself from “frivolous” constitutional arguments.  Part 4 discusses decisions of the 
German Constitutional Court under the German Basic Law’s due process, equal 
protection, human dignity and social state provisions.  More specifically, Part 4A traces 
the constitutional jurisprudence limiting the power of the legislature to tax the subsistence 
minimum as a matter of equality and protection of human dignity.  Part 4B examines the 
decisions that interdict marriage penalties on the bases of equality and protection of 
marriage principles.  Part 4C describes and discusses the recent decision mandating 
practical ability to assess and collect a tax as a condition to its imposition on equality 
principle grounds.  Part 4D looks to the Constitutional Court’s approach to retroactive 
taxation under rule of law principles.  Part 4E observes direct application of the equality 
principle to the Wealth and Inheritance Taxes.  Part 4F reviews some Turnover Tax cases 
to demonstrate that horizontal equity in the turnover tax is required but vertical equity is 
not.  Part 5 offers hypotheses to explain the reasons for the greater receptivity to 
constitutional challenges in the German Constitutional Court relative to the United States 
Supreme Court.41
Part 2.  Overview comparison of the German and U.S. taxing structures.  German tax 
legislation is predominantly federal.  While the Basic Law reserves revenues from certain 
taxing sources to the states and municipalities42 and permits the states and municipalities 
to legislate in specific areas,43 in practice, taxing legislation is federal.  State and local 
legislatures can set some tax rates where federal legislation authorizes them to do so.44
The principal taxes, income,45 company,46 and turnover,47 respectively, are federal taxes 
41 The Article will not address the relationship between Germany and the other members of the European 
Union or ongoing efforts to harmonize taxation throughout the European Union.   
42 Basic Law Art. 106. 
43 Basic Law Art. 105. 
44 For example, section 25 of the Real Property Tax Law of 1973 (Aug. 8, 1973, as amended through 
December 12, 2000) [GrStG 1973, §25] (available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/grstg_1973/index.html)specifically authorizes the communities to 
establish the rate of tax, and to fix any increase from the previous calendar year no later than June 30 of any 
year. 
45 The Income Tax Law, version of Oct. 19, 2002, as amended through June 6, 2005 [Das 
Einkommensteuergesetz  (Neugefasst durch Bek. v. 19.10.2002 I 4210, (2003 I 179), zuletzt geändert durch 
28 G v. 21. 6.2005 I 1818)] (EStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/estg/index.html). 
46 The Company Tax Law of 1977, version of Oct. 15, 2002, as amended through December 12, 2004 [Das 
Körperschaftsteuergesetz 1977 (Neugefaßt durch Bek. v. 15.10.2002 I 4144, zuletzt geändert durch Art. 4 
G v. 15.12.2004 I 3416)] (KStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/kstg_1977/index.html).  The customary translation of the 
Körperschaftsteuer is the corporate tax but that seems an insufficient description for a reader in the U.S., as 
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that the Basic Law requires the federal government to share with the states48 and the 
states to share with the municipalities.49  The income and company taxes are direct 
taxes50 on the income of individuals in the case of the income tax51 and the income of 
companies in the case of the company tax.52  Most tax commentators consider the 
turnover tax to be an indirect tax.53  Its base is the value of goods or services and the 
taxable event is delivery of goods or services for compensation.54 The statute allows a 
credit for the turnover tax paid earlier in the delivery process if the taxpayer received the 
goods or services for further distribution.55  Accordingly, the burden of the turnover tax 
falls upon the ultimate consumer because the tax becomes part of the price.56  The 
turnover tax is a consumption tax like the value added tax57 and comparable to sales taxes 
common to almost all states in the United States.58
 By comparison, the United States integrates its individual and corporate income 
taxes into a single taxing structure under the Internal Revenue Code.59  Nevertheless, the 
the tax reaches all German limited liability entities as well, including the most common entity, the 
Gemeinschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company).  KStG § 1.  Under U.S. tax law, 
limited liability entities are tax transparent (tax conduits) under subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code 
of  1986, as amended (the “Code”).  
47 The Turnover Tax Law of 1980, version of February 2, 2005 [Das Umsatzsteuergesetz 1980 (Neugefasst 
durch Bek. v. 21.2.2005 I 386)] (UStG followed by a section number in the following) (available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/ustg_1980/index.html). 
48 Basic Law Art. 106, Para. 3. 
49 Id. Para. 5a. 
50 A tax is direct if the party who pays the tax also bears the burden of the tax.  While an income tax is a 
classical direct tax, considerable disagreement concerning corporate income taxes arises because many 
economists argue that entities shift the burden of the tax to their customers through product and service 
pricing.  Absent competition from non-taxable sellers and service providers, neither the entity, through 
decreased profits, nor its owners would bear the incidence of the entity level tax.  Interestingly, that 
argument overstates the point, as even individuals who provide goods or services arguably could pass the 
incidence of income taxes on to their customers through higher prices so long as there is no non-taxable 
competition.  Compare Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 54-7. 
51 See, generally, Klaus Tipke & Joachim Lang, STEUERRECHT, Ch. 9 (17th ed. Köln 2002) (“Tipke/Lang” 
in the following). 
52 Id. Ch. 11. 
53 Id. Ch. 14.   
54 UStG, supra note 47, § 1. 
55 Id. § 15. 
56 See, generally, Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 555. 
57 Value added taxes generally are imposes at each step in a distribution process on the increase in value 
that the taxable step adds.  Customarily, the taxing statute either subtracts vendor’s purchase price from the 
vendor’s resale price and subjects that remainder to the tax or computes the tax on the vendor’s resale price 
and subtracts the value added tax paid earlier in the process.  Thus, for example, a manufacturer buys raw 
materials that were subject to the value added tax and transforms them into a finished good.  It is the 
increased value of the finished good over the raw material that is the subject of the tax. 
58 Sales taxes are also consumption taxes but differ from value added taxes as the taxable event is the 
purchase by the end user.  The vendor collects the tax at point of sale by adding the tax to the sale price.  
Sales for resale are exempt from the tax.  For example, see § 144.010 R.S.Mo. (defining sales at retail) and 
§ 144.020 R.S.Mo. (imposing the tax on sellers engaged in the business of selling at retail). 
59 The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code” or “IRC” followed by a section number in 
the following), is Title 26 of the United States Code.  Chapter 1 of the Code unifies the treatment of all 
income-based taxes, both individual and entity. 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 6 
distinction between one taxing statute and two is insignificant.60  The Code applies one 
set of rates to individuals61 and a different set to corporations.62  Numerous other 
differences between the rules applicable to individuals and those applicable to 
corporations permeate chapter 1 of the Code.  For example, differing rules apply to 
various classes of deductions for individuals, but not corporations, as all corporate 
deductions are fundamentally trade or business deductions;63 individuals receive an 
allowance for personal exemptions and corporations do not;64 and a reduced rate of tax 
applies to individual’s long term capital gains.65  The German company income tax has a 
much broader reach than does the U.S. corporate income tax.  All corporations in 
Germany are subject to tax at corporate level,66 while corporations meeting specific 
ownership requirements in the U.S. may elect tax transparency, so that their owners are 
subject to tax on the entities’ income rather than the entities themselvees.67  The German 
tax applies as well to all entities that enjoy any form of limited liability, including limited 
liability companies68 and limited partnerships on shares.69  Most similar entities in the 
United States such as limited liability companies and limited partnerships are transparent 
for federal income tax purposes but may elect to be taxed as corporations.70
60 A more significant difference lies in the administration of the tax, the United States relies on self-
assessment, IRC § 6011, while the tax collector assesses all taxes in Germany.  See, generally, Roman Seer, 
BESTEUERUNGSVERFAHREN: RECHTSVERGLEICH USA-DEUTSCHLAND 51-58 (Heidelberg 2002), for a brief 
explanation of the German assessment system. 
61 IRC §1. 
62 IRC §11.  
63 IRC § 62 applies only to individuals and allows certain deductions for individuals as adjustments to gross 
income, while other deductions are itemized deductions allowable in determining taxable income under 
IRC § 63 and allowable only if the individual elects to itemize.  Individuals itemize if the deductions 
allowable under IRC § 63 exceed in the aggregate the standard deduction amount under IRC § 63(c).  
Corporations’ deductions are allowable in arriving at taxable income under § 63 with no election to itemize 
and no standard deduction as an alternative. 
64 IRC § 151. 
65 IRC § 1(h). 
66 KStG § 1.   
67 Subchapter S of the Code, IRC §1361 et seq.  Corporations that may elect to be S corporations would not 
operate in corporate form in Germany at all.  Most likely they would be limited liability companies 
(Gemeinschaften mit beschränkter Haftung) with stock companies (other than limited partnerships on 
shares – Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien) being only large, publicly traded entities in Germany. 
68 German limited liability companies are Gemeinschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH).  While they 
are statutory entities in Germany as they are in the U.S., federal law authorizes and governs them in 
Germany.  See, generally the Law governing Limited Liability Companies of Aug. 1, 1986, most recently 
amended July 19, 2002 (GmbHG in the following). 
69 Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien. 
70 Subchapter K of the Code, IRC § 701 et seq. governs partnerships, both general and limited, and provides 
for full tax transparency so that the entities’ owners are taxable on their shares of the entities’ income and 
the entities are not taxable.  Treas. reg. § 301.7701-3 (2002) classifies U.S. limited liability companies as 
partnerships for federal income tax purposes but classifies most foreign limited liability entities as 
associations taxable as corporations for U. S. tax purposes.  U.S. partnerships and limited liabilities may 
elect to be associations taxable as corporations, and foreign limited liability companies, including the 
German GmbH, may elect to be partnerships for U.S. tax purposes.  Treas. reg. § 301.7701-3(c).  
Partnerships and limited liability companies that are publicly traded and engage in the active conduct of 
business rather than investment activities are treated as corporations for tax purposes.  IRC § 7704.  Treas. 
reg. §301.7701-2, 3 resolved the classification issue in the U.S.  The issue has a fascinating history in the 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 7 
Although at times some legislators and tax theoreticians have proposed enactment 
of a national consumption tax,71 the United States has no national consumption tax.72
Most states, however, impose a consumption tax in the form of a sales73 or gross receipts 
tax74 on the sale of goods for consumption in the state.  Sales of goods by an in-state 
vendor for delivery outside the state generally are exempt from the tax.75  States having a 
sales type tax impose a complementary use tax in order to tax the consumption in the 
state of goods transported into the state for consumption that were not subject to sales tax 
in another jurisdiction.76  With the exception of telecommunications services,77 states 
generally impose no consumption-based tax on rendition of services within the state.78
Accordingly, incidence of a consumption tax in the U.S. is far narrower than in Germany.  
In addition, the states determine their own rates of tax on sales,79 so that the rates are not 
uniform as the rate is under the German turnover tax.80
Vertical equity principles81 complement fundamental horizontal equity 
assumptions82 in both the German and U.S. income tax systems and underlie structural 
U.S.  See, generally, William S. McKee, William F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶3.06-3.07 (1996). 
71 Currently pending before Congress is a proposal to replace the Internal Revenue Code with a single, 
national sales tax.  Fair Tax Act of 2003, H.R. 25 (108th Cong. 1st Sess).  See William G. Gale, The 
National Retail Sales Tax: What Would The Rate Have To Be?, 107 TAX NOTES 889 (2005) (explaining 
the tax base and presenting economic data critical of the proposal).  See, generally, Rethinking the Tax 
Code, Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee (108th Cong. 1st Sess) (Nov. 11, 2003) (includes 
statements promoting and opposing the value added tax); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of 
Tax, 103 MICHIGAN L. REV. 807 (2005) (discussing consumption taxes); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, 
Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States:  A Tax Policy 
Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (discussing various proposals for 
reform, including a value added tax). 
72 See discussion infra in note 168 concerning whether a national consumption tax might be 
unconstitutional as a prohibited direct tax. 
73 Only Alaska, Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon do not impose a general, statewide sales tax or 
equivalent.  2003 ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK ¶210 (2003). 
74 Illinois uses a retail occupation tax model and Delaware a gross receipts model.  Id.
75 12 CSR 10-3.888 (2005) (delivery outside the state exempt from sales tax if buyer claims exemption). 
76 2003 ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 73, ¶210 
77 Most states impose a tax on telecommunication services.  Id. at ¶259. 
78 Exceptions exist for services of altering or installing a product but the imposition of the tax is not 
uniform from state to state.  Id. at ¶253 shows a lack of uniformity in taxation of leasing of goods, ¶254 
repair and installation, and ¶255-A for alterations. 
79 For those states that impose a statewide sales tax, rates range from Colorado’s low of 2.9% to 
California’s high of 7.25%.  California includes a uniform 1.25% local tax while other states have varying 
local sales taxes in addition to the statewide tax.  Thus, Mississippi and Rhode Island share the high end at 
a state level tax of 7%.  Id. at ¶250. 
80 UStG § 12.  Uniformity of consumption tax in Germany diminishes as local governments impose 
specialized consumption taxes on consumption of beverages, amusements, including hunting and fishing, 
ownership of dogs, etc.  Basic Law Art 105, Para. 2a authorizes these local taxes. 
81 Vertical equity is a means concept -- the greater the taxpayer’s means as measured by income, the greater 
the share of the overall income tax burden the taxpayer should bear.  Richard A. Westin, WG&L TAX 
DICTIONARY at 835 (2000).  In its tax decisions, the German Constitutional Court remains mindful of 
vertical, as well as horizontal, equity principles.  For example, BVerfGE 82, 60, supra note 29, at 89. 
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decisions that lead to an expressed, although not necessarily an actual, preference for 
progressive taxation in both countries.83  While progressive taxation is the 
disproportional increase in taxpayers’ tax burdens as those taxpayers’ wealth and 
incomes increase,84 this Article addresses progressivity relative to income, rather than 
wealth,85 as it discusses the combined effect of income and consumption taxes.  Thus, 
increasing tax rates as a taxpayer’s amount of income increases signals the presence of 
progressive taxation.86  Both German and U.S. personal income taxes employ graduated 
rate structures with positive rates in Germany ranging from a minimum of just over 16% 
(0% if one views capital gain as income) to a maximum of 45% (a 29% range)87 and in 
the U.S. from a minimum of 10% to a maximum of 35% on ordinary income88 and, with 
exceptions for certain categories of net capital gain,89 a minimum of 5 percent90 to a 
82 Horizontal equity requires that identically situated taxpayers bear identical shares of the tax burden.  
Westin, supra note 81, at 338.  Horizontal equity is conceptually neutral with respect to progression or 
regression in taxation.   
83 Progressive taxation injects vertical equity into the tax system by imposing a greater proportional tax 
burden, customarily through graduated rates, on taxpayers with greater incomes.  For a concise discussion 
of progressive taxation in the U.S., see Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., THE UNEASY CASE FOR 
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (Chicago 1953, revised 1963).  See for Germany, Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 
113 identifying the principle of redistribution of wealth through progressive taxation as a function of the 
social state principle, Basic Law Art. 20, rather than the equality principle, Basic Law Art. 3, that requires 
equal taxation of like situated taxpayers.  And for an excellent overview of the literature and problems with 
progressive taxation debate, see Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 919 (1997). 
84 Blum & Kalven, UNEASY CASE, supra note 83, at 4. 
85 U.S. federal gift and estate taxes, chapters 25 and 20 of the Code respectively, are examples of taxes that 
are fundamentally progressive relative to wealth.  Relative to income, however, both the gift and estate 
taxes may be regressive for several reasons.  Gifts are excludable from the gross income of the recipient 
under IRC §102.  Gifts of appreciated property from higher income tax bracket taxpayers to lower bracket 
taxpayers draw less income tax upon sale of the property than they would have if the higher bracket 
taxpayer sold the property because the donee becomes taxable on the gain.  The donee takes the donor’s 
adjusted basis in the property under IRC §1015 for purposes of determining the donee’s gain.  Gifts at 
death, however, eliminate the taxation of all historical gain in the property, as the donee’s adjusted basis 
becomes the fair market value of the property at the date of the donor’s death (or the alternate valuation 
date) under IRC §1014. 
86 Westin, supra note 81, at 555. 
87 EStG § 32a.  Rates in Germany climb both in steps and in a linear progression that is a function of the 
amount by which a taxpayer’s income exceeds the zero rate or exempt amount (Grundfreibetrag).  For an 
explanation of the rate structure, see Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 426-27.  Each taxpayer enjoys a basic 
zero bracket on the initial € 7,664 of income.  While the statute employs the same terminology (Freibetrag 
– exempt amount) for the allowances for dependent children under EStG § 32, for example, those amounts 
reduce taxable income under EStG § 2, as do personal exemptions under U.S. tax law, IRC § 151, and, 
accordingly, retard the rate progression.  On the other hand, various exclusions from income such as 
unemployment compensation, while exempt from tax, count toward determining the rate of tax on the next 
euro of income.  EStG §32b. 
88 IRC § 1(a) – (d), (i).  The rates set forth in IRC § 1(i) will return to the rates appearing in IRC § 1(a) after 
2010, as provided in Section 901 of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 
107-16 (107th Cong., 1st Sess. 2001) (EGTRRA in the following). 
89 I.R.C. § 1(h) taxes unrecaptured section 1250 gain, defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(6), at a 25% rate and 
collectibles gain, defined in I.R.C. § 1(h)(5)(A), at a 28% rate. 
90 I.R.C. § 1202 excludes half the gain on qualified small business stock from gross income (a zero rate) 
and taxes the remaining gain at 28%. 
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maximum of 15% for net capital gain (a 25% range on ordinary income, but a 35% range 
integrating ordinary income and net capital gain).91  Germany also imposes a 5.5 percent 
surtax to support the cost of reunification,92 but generally does not tax capital gain.93
Structurally, both the German and the U.S. income taxes appear progressive, as their rates 
increase with income.   
The U.S. income tax, however, is somewhat more progressive in its rate structure 
than the German income tax.94  Under the German income tax, all income in excess of € 
52,152 (€ 104,304 for married individuals electing joint assessment) draws the maximum 
45% rate,95 while under the U.S. rate schedule, the rate brackets are broader and adjust 
for inflation96 so that a married couple filing a joint federal income tax return reaches the 
maximum 35% rate on incremental taxable income only in excess of $326,450 for the tax 
year 2005.97  The U.S. does not use a linear progression as Germany does98 but rather a 
series of five rate brackets99 (six if one counts the zero rate resulting from the combined 
effect of personal exemptions100 and the standard deduction101).  Further, the U.S. income 
91 IRC § 1(h).  This net capital gain provision taxes various types of net capital gain at differing rates 
ranging at maximum from 15% to 28%.  In addition, the range will narrow to 20-28% as the provisions of 
EGTRRA sunset, as set forth supra note 88.  IRC §1(h)(11) treats most corporate dividends as an increase 
to net capital gain taxed at the lower rates.  IRC §1222(11) defines net capital gain as the excess of net long 
term capital gains (§1222(7), over net short term capital losses (§1222(6)). 
92 Germany added the Solidarity Supplement Law in 1993 and replaced in 1995 (Solidaritätszuschlaggesetz 
1995), currently, the applicable version was published October 15, 2002 and amended December 23, 2002. 
93 Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 390.  Disposition of income producing property, capital gain, is disposition 
of the income source, not income.  Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 236-7.  In light of the recent Constitutional 
Court decision on assessment and collection, BVerfGE 110, 94, supra note 30, discussed infra in part 4C, 
even the limited inclusion of capital gains under the German system has become narrower.   
94 This observation may be somewhat surprising as one often associates a developed welfare system like 
Germany has with tax progression.  Germany’s taxes are higher than U.S. taxes so that Germany may 
support its welfare system, but they are not necessarily more progressive, just steeply progressive.  
95 EStG §32a.  Germany does not apply differing rate schedules to married and single individuals, so that 
joint assessment under EStG § 26b combines the incomes and then splits them into two taxpayers for 
computational purposes even though they remain jointly liable for the tax.  Joint assessment renders 
spouses jointly and severally liable for the combined tax debt.  Abgabeordnung (Tax Code) § 44 ¶ 1 
(Version of October 10, 2002, most recently amended September 22, 2005) (Neugefasst durch Bek. v.  
1.10.2002 I 3866; 2003 I 61 zuletzt geändert durch Art. 4 Abs. 22 G v. 22. 9.2005 I 2809) (available at:  
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ao_1977/__44.html).  Despite joint assessment, however, either 
spouse may request separate assessment on his or her separate income only at any time 
before payment in full of the jointly assessed tax liability.  Abgabeordnung §268.
96 IRC § 1(f).  The rate schedules under IRC § 1 (a) – (d) set the maximum rates for 1992, but the brackets 
adjust for the increase in the cost of living, measured by the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers 
that the U.S. Department of Labor publishes. 
97 IRC § 1(a) sets forth the 1992 level of $250,000, and the bracket adjustments in 2005 under IRC § 1(f) 
will cause the maximum rate to affect married individuals filing jointly on their incomes in excess of 
$326,450.  Rates available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=133517,00.html.  For purposes of 
comparison, this Article assumes that the euro and dollar are equal in value.  During much of 2002 a dollar 
was worth approximate 15% more than the euro and the converse has been true since 2003. 
98 Supra note 87. 
99 IRC § 1(a) – (d). 
100 IRC § 151. 
101 IRC § 63(c). 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 10 
tax includes a negative income tax feature for low-wage workers in the form of the 
earned income credit102 and Germany does not.103
In addition, the personal exemption amounts and the standard deduction increase 
to reflect positive changes in the cost of living.104  In upper income ranges, U.S. tax rules 
add further progression by phasing out the deduction for personal exemptions105 and 
limiting the availability of various deductions for taxpayers who elect to itemize.106  The 
German concept corresponding to U.S. personal exemptions are the basic exempt 
amount107 and the exempt amounts for dependent children.108  These exemptions are 
available to all taxpayers, including those with the largest incomes.109
If one assumes middle and upper incomes in Germany and the U.S. are 
comparable, middle-income taxpayers in Germany tend to become less distinguishable 
from upper income taxpayers, than are their American counterparts, with respect to tax 
progression positioning.  German middle-income taxpayers have the same basic 
exemption as the highest income taxpayers and the same dependency allowances as the 
highest income taxpayers with the same number of dependents.  Since they reach the 
maximum rate of tax at only € 104,304, they tend to pay the same proportional tax as the 
102 IRC § 32 provides a refundable credit for taxpayers within a narrow band of wage and self-employment 
based income.   
103 Lest a reader think the U.S. more generous in it welfare type benefits than Germany, Germany provides 
a broad range of direct subsidies to its low income and indigent citizens and lawful residents, including 
unemployment supplements, child supplements, social insurance, universal health insurance, government 
pension system.  See, generally, Claus Offe, The German Welfare State: Principles, Performance, Prospects 
in John S. Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Elise Wiliarty eds., The Postwar Transformation of 
Germany : Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood 202 (Ann Arbor 1999). 
104 IRC §151(d)(4) for personal exemptions and § 63(c)(4) for the standard deduction. 
105 IRC §151(d)(4) reduces the personal exemptions by 2% for each $2,500 of income over a threshold 
amount.  The threshold is $150,000 for married individuals filing joint returns.  The EGTRRA, supra note 
88, beginning in 2006 phases out the exemption’s phase out subject to the sunset under section 901 of 
EGTRRA.   
106 IRC §68 diminishes itemized deductions for higher income individuals thereby adding both 
progressivity and complexity.  In addition, IRC §67 limits certain deductions to their aggregate amount in 
excess of two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.  The two percent floor grows with income 
and forces disallowance of ever greater amounts of those deductions.  These features, phase-outs and 
deduction limitations, increase the effective rate of tax for taxpayers with specific characteristics.  Some of 
the features create a tax bubble, that is, an increase in rate at certain income levels followed by a 
subsequent decrease in rate as income increases further.  See, generally, Gregory G. Geisler and Ernest R. 
Larkins, Current Year Tax Laws That Cause Low Visibility Of An Individual's Effective Marginal Tax 
Rate, 101 TAX NOTES 627 (2003) and Martin A. Sullivan, The Rich Get Soaked while the Super Rich 
Slide, 101 TAX NOTES 581 (2003). 
107 EStG § 32a establishes the Grundfreibetrag. 
108 EStG § 32 (6) and EStG § 31 assures the non-taxability of a subsistence minimum for all taxpayers 
without regard to overall income. 
109 Decisions of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990), supra note 29, for 
example, preclude the German parliament from reducing or eliminating personal exemptions and the 
subsistence minimum exemption that the basic exempt amount embodies.  See detailed discussion of these 
decisions infra in Part 4A. 
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upper income taxpayers.110  The German income tax approaches a two rate system 
applicable to all taxpayers, a zero rate on part of the income and 45% on the rest.  By 
comparison, married U.S. taxpayers filing jointly with $104,000 of taxable income would 
have three brackets representing together 140% of their rate before topping out.111  And 
the phase-out of the personal exemptions would further distinguish the middle-income 
taxpayer, as there is no phase-out in Germany.112
Whatever progressivity the income tax introduces into the federal taxes in 
Germany and the United States, other features of the overall tax system undercut 
progressivity.  The Constitutional Court, discussing the wealth tax, stated the principle 
that with respect to the individual’s production:  “the total tax burden remain … a 
division of around half for private and half for public use.”113  Germany raises 
approximately the same amount of tax revenue with its turnover tax as it does with its 
income tax.114  The turnover tax diminishes the progressivity present in the income tax by 
placing a larger proportional tax burden on lower income taxpayers than on higher 
income taxpayers.  Lower income taxpayers lack discretionary income because they tend 
to have to expend all their income in order to provide for basic consumption of their 
necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and housing.  Of those necessities, only 
110 Extrapolating from some limited statistics available for 1998, it appears that between 4 and 5% of 
German taxpayers would be subject to the highest income tax rate in Germany while less than one-half of 
one percent would reach the highest U.S. rate on a euro-dollar equivalence.  Verteilung der 
Markteinkommen und der Einkommensteuerschuld in Deutschland:  Eine Auswertung anhand von 
einkommensteuerlichen Veranlagungsdaten, Tabelle 92 (available at http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/download/ziffer/z822_846j03.pdf). 
111 Married taxpayers having combined income exceeding the minimum level for the maximum German 
rate of tax of € 104,000 (on a euro-dollar equivalence) represented approximately 8% of U.S. taxpayers 
who filed returns in 2002.  Brian Balcovic, High Income Tax Returns for 2002, Table 2 (available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02hiinco.pdf).  Note that the estimates do not include individuals who do not 
file returns.  Those with combined incomes exceeding the U.S. entrance to the top rate of $326,450 
represent significantly less than 2% of returns filed, as approximately 1.89% of the U.S. returns have 
income in excess of $200,000 so that the number with income in excess of $300,000 is significantly 
smaller.  Id. at 6 and Table A. 
112 A phase-out would tax the subsistence minimum for taxpayers subject to the phase-out.  Taxing the 
subsistence minimum violates the principle established in the Constitutional Court decisions discussed 
infra in Part 4A. 
113 BVerfGE 93, 121, supra note 28, at 138 translating:  “die steuerliche Gesamtbelastung … in der Nähe 
einer hälftigen Teilung zwischen privater und öffentlicher Hand …” (referring to the estimated yield from 
property for purposes of the wealth tax).  Obviously, the split ignores the value added tax and the social 
insurance imposts.  But see BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2194/99 (January 18, 2006), available at:  
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20051011_1bvr123200, rejecting a challenge to 
a combined effective rate of Income and Municipal Business (Gewerbesteuer, infra note 430) exceeding 
fifty percent as violating this fifty-fifty principle and holding that the 50-50 principle does not establish an 
absolute ceiling on permissible taxation. 
114 Bundesministerium der Finanzen Referat I A 6, supra note 23, Tabelle 2.  And see Statistisches 
Bundesamt Deutschland, .Kassenmäßige Steuereinnahmen Deutschland (available at 
http://www.destatis.de/indicators/d/lrfin02ad.htm) discloses that the turnover tax in 2003 produced 
approximate 21.5% of revenues while the personal income tax produced 35.9%.  Adding other 
consumption taxes to the turnover tax, the percentage increases to 33.5%. 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 12 
the rental expenditure for housing is exempt from the turnover tax.115  However, even in 
the case of rental housing, most tenants are not free from indirect taxes.116  Tenants 
generally bear the burden of their shares of the property owner’s real property tax,117 as 
the property owner passes it along with other expenses through the rental price.118
Individuals with greater incomes may expend more overall and, therefore, pay more tax 
than the low income individual, but they are far less likely to expend all their income than 
are lower income individuals.  Since money devoted to investment does not attract the 
turnover tax,119 the greater one’s income, the smaller the percentage of that income that 
becomes subject to the turnover tax, as the taxpayer devotes an ever smaller percentage 
of her income to consumption.  A tax burden that decreases as a proportion of income as 
income increases is regressive.   
Germany’s turnover tax, unlike its income tax, has no exemption amount but 
seeks to ameliorate its inherent regressivity through a dual rate system.  The general 
turnover tax rate is sixteen percent120 but a seven percent rate applies to many necessities 
including, public transportation121 and foodstuffs, other than those a vendor sells for 
consumption on the premises,122 but not clothing that is taxed at the full rate.  The 
reduced rate applies without regard to the characteristics of the consumer, low income or 
high income.  The reduced rate diminishes the tax burden on all taxpayers and may 
115 UStG § 4 (12a) exempts rent from the turnover tax except for transient use of property, hotel rooms for 
example.   
116 In the United States as well. 
117 Grundsteuergesetz 1973 (GrStG in the following) § 1 authorizes the communities (municipalities) to 
determine the rate of tax so that the rate is not uniform throughout Germany.  The community imposes the 
tax on the value of the real property, rather than directly on the rent that the owner derives from the real 
property, under GrStG § 2.  Rent is the fee for services or sales price term for the price a buyer pays for the 
use of property.  While the base for the property tax is property value rather than price for use, the real 
property tax, nevertheless, resembles a consumption tax in that the value of real property used to produce 
income is a function of the income, that is, the rent.  Germany establishes valuation methodology statutorily 
with its valuation law (Bewertungsgesetz, Neugefasst durch Bek. v. 1. 2.1991 I 230, zuletzt geändert durch 
Art. 14 G v. 20.12.2001 I 3794, BewG followed by a section number in the following).   The general 
valuation law confirms this relationship as valuation of residential rental property (BewG §76 (1) 1.) refers 
to BewG § 79 that begins with annual income and applies a multiplier.  The multiplier relates to the type of 
use that produces the rent.  BewG § 80 refers to the statutory supplements to fix the multiplier, and the 
statutory supplements are a function of the size of the community and the nature and age of the building 
construction. 
118 A rental pricing model would anticipate that rent is a function of the landlord’s costs, including property 
tax and maintenance, in providing the rental property plus profit, a pricing model that does not differ 
materially from the pricing of goods.  While the landlord may fix the rent by examining the overall market, 
presumably the market generalizes the model.  But models for pricing rentals abound and use a variety of 
formulae.  See, for example, Bill Veneris, Setting Rental Rates is a Balancing Act, Rental Management 
(2004) (available at http://www.rentalmanagementmag.com/newsart.asp?ARTID=1407); Kenneth T. Rosen 
and Lawrence B. Smith, The Price-Adjustment Process for Rental Housing and the Natural Vacancy Rate, 
73 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 779 (1983); Joseph L. Pagliari, Jr. and James R. Webb, On Setting 
Apartment Rental Rates:  A Regression-Based Approach, 12 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 37 
(2001). 
119 UStG §4(8) exempts the sale of corporate stocks and bonds. 
120 UStG §12 (1) 
121 UStG §12 (2) 10. 
122 UStG §12 (2) 1. and Anlage (supplement). 
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introduce limited progressivity in the middle income range, as middle income taxpayers 
may spend a very large percentage of their income on consumption weighted toward the 
higher rate items.  In addition, the amount of the subsistence minimum that remains 
exempt from income tax for all taxpayers presumably includes the various indirect taxes 
that individuals must pay.123  Under the German definition of income that generally 
excludes capital gains,124 regressivity would arise only with respect to high-income 
taxpayers who invest rather than consuming their income and then only vis à vis other 
middle or upper income taxpayers who consume a greater percentage of their respective 
incomes.125
In the U.S., consumption taxes at state level inject regressivity into the combined 
federal and state tax system.126  Like the German turnover tax, some of the state sales 
taxes use dual or multiple rate structures to ameliorate the regressivity of the sales tax127
or burden limited types of expenditures more heavily.128  Most states tax sales of goods 
but not performance of services under their consumption tax, leaving the taxation of 
services to the income tax while sales of goods are subject to both income and sales 
taxes.  Low income individuals tend to consume proportionally fewer services that do 
high income individuals, so that this characteristic of the sales tax system adds additional 
regressivity overall.  The Supreme Court has not held regressive taxation to be 
unconstitutional even though it determined that a graduated state tax on retail sales 
violated the equal protection clause because gross sales was not a measure of profitability 
to which a graduated rate tax might apply.129
123 Exemption of the subsistence minimum occurs through various exemptions, EStG §32, for example 
(describing various exemptions [Freibeträge], and the zero rate bracket [Grundfreibetrag], EStG §32a).  
The constitutional court identifies a relationship between indirect taxes and the amount of the subsistence 
minimum that defines the exempt amounts.  BVerfGE 87, 153 at 156 (September 25, 1992, II Senat), 
discussed infra in text commencing with note 381.  This Article discusses the dichotomy between 
mandatory and discretionary expenditures and the exemption of the mandatory expenditures (subsistence 
minimum) from the income tax infra in Part 4A.  
124 Unlike the U.S., Germany does not tax capital appreciation.  Supra note 93.  If, in order to generate a 
consistent measure of regressivity across taxing systems, one views capital appreciation or even only 
realized gains from the disposition of capital investments as income that draws a zero rate of tax, the 
presence of regressivity in the German system is likely to emerge relative to low income taxpayers as well 
as middle income taxpayers. 
125 See Appendix for this analysis. 
126 See notes 72 - 79 supra and accompanying text for discussion of those consumption taxes. 
127 For example, Illinois and Missouri reduce the rate for food.  ALL STATES TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 
73, at ¶250. 
128 Passenger car rentals in New York, liquor in Arkansas, for examples.  Id.
129 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, reh. denied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935) (Kentucky’s graduated 
rate tax on gross retail sales violated equal protection because not rationally related with any certainty to 
ability to pay).  See discussion infra in Part 3B.   
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At federal level, moreover, the social security,130 self-employment131 and 
Medicare taxes132 introduce considerable regressivity into the tax laws because they tax 
income from wages133 and self-employment,134 but not investment,135 and because the 
social security and self-employment taxes do not even reach all employment and self-
employment income.136  Employed, low income individuals pay social security tax even 
when they are exempt from federal income tax.137  Congress designed the earned income 
credit,138 in part, to compensate for the social security tax low wage earners would have 
to pay.139  Through lower wages, employees tend to bear the burden of both their own 
and the employer’s share of the social security tax.140
Germany likewise has a series of wage and self-employment income based taxes 
to finance social insurance programs,141 including a national pension program,142
unemployment insurance,143 universal health care insurance144 and long-term care 
insurance.145  Employer and employee make equal contributions with respect to the 
employee’s salary.  While the governing statutes call the payments contributions to 
130 IRC §§3101(a), 3111(a) [employee, employer respectively social security tax for old-age, survivors, and 
disability insurance].  See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 17, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (determining 
that the social security tax neither violates the uniformity clause, despite limitations on its applicability to 
specific industries and numbers of employees, nor reservation of powers to the states clause of U.S.
Constitution Amend. 10 and is constitutional). Some argue that the social security tax, for example, is not 
a tax, even though it is an involuntary imposition.  See Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 45 for discussion of 
what constitutes a tax.   
131 IRC § 1401(a) [tax on self-employment income for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance  
132 IRC § 1401(b) [hospital tax on self-employment income], §§3101(b), 3111(b) [employee, employer 
respectively hospital tax]. 
133 IRC §§3101(a), 3121(a) (defining wages). 
134 IRC §§1401(a), 1402(a) (defining self-employment income). 
135 IRC § 86 taxes as much as half the social security benefits that certain middle and higher income 
individuals receive and thereby adds a little progressivity in connection with social security benefits. 
136 IRC §1402(b) defines self-employment income as limited by the Social Security Act section 230 
contribution and benefit base so as to form the ceiling.  The base does increase for inflation.  Similarly, IRC 
§3121 limits wages for purposes of IRC §§3101(a) and 3111(a) in the same manner.   
137 William G. Gale and Jeffrey Rohaly, Three-Quarters Of Filers Pay More In Payroll Taxes Than In 
Income Taxes, 98 Tax Notes 119 (January 6, 2003). 
138 Supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
139 HR 2166, HR Report 94-19 at 10 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, Feb. 25, 1975) and more directly, S.Rep. 94-36 
(94th Cong. 1st Sess, March 17, 1975) at 11 that reads in part:  “[t]he credit is set at 10 percent in order to 
correspond roughly to the added burdens placed on workers by both the employee and employer social 
security contributions.”  
140 Id.  The Senate report certainly suggests that Senate taxwriters believed that the employee bore the 
burden of both the employer’s and the employee’s share of social security taxes. 
141 For general information on German social insurance programs, see Willem Adema, Donald Gray and 
Sigrun Kahl, Labour Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers – No. 58 – Social Assistance in 
Germany, OECD Document JT00137448 (2003), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/60/34004521.pdf. 
142 With a contribution rate of 9.55% (19.1% total) on gross earnings up to €54,000.  Germany 2002 – Tax-
benefit country chapter – Benefits and Wages §10.2 (2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/43/2491133.pdf 
143 With a contribution rate of 3.25% (6.5% total) on gross earnings up to €54,000.  Id. 
144 With a contribution rate of 7.00% (14% total) on gross earnings up to €40,500.  Id. 
145 With a contribution rate of 0.85% (1.7% total) on gross earnings up to €40,500.  Id. 
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insurance or pension plans, the imposts are mandatory not elective.  So the payments are 
the equivalent of taxes as are the social security and Medicare taxes in the United 
States.146  Also, like the United States, the tax base in each instance relates to services 
income but not investment income, so that the series of insurance payments tends toward 
the regressive.  Germany’s social insurance contributions distinguish themselves from 
United States contributions in that they have very moderate wage and self-employment 
income caps.147
Both the German and the U.S. tax systems rely heavily on an income tax to raise 
governmental revenues.  Within the income taxes, both systems appear to adopt the 
concept of vertical equity through progressive taxation.  Yet, neither the German nor the 
U.S. tax system consistently adheres to progressivity as fundamental to tax structure.  
Rather both systems permit considerable regressivity in the combined impact of assorted 
taxes, the U.S. with its social security and self-employment taxes and Germany with its 
turnover tax.  With that observation by way of background, notions of fairness that may 
underlie either or both systems must remain on the horizontal plane – tax fairness, and 
courts’ intervention to assure fairness remains a matter of treating like taxpayers alike.   
Part 3 The United States – Constitutional Arguments Generally Fail as to Federal 
Statutes but not State Statutes. 
 Although taxpayers have challenged federal tax classifications on equal protection 
grounds,148 the database for a recent empirical study of U.S. Supreme Court decision-
making in tax cases149 discloses no case in which taxpayers were successful.150  On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court was receptive to a due process challenge to retroactive 
application of the estate tax151 and the gift tax152 as applied to transfers at death or by gift 
before enactment of the tax.  More recently, however, retroactivity arguments challenging 
the minimum tax153 and a technical correction have failed.154  Hence, unlike the German 
146 See supra note 130. 
147 Supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
148 E.g. Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (unsuccessfully arguing that 
exclusion from I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) classification for lobbying denied equal protection vis á vis veterans 
organizations) discussed infra in text accompanying note 213. 
149 Nancy Staudt and Peter Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database (soon to be published on 
http://law.wustl.edu), supra note 9.  The database identified 157 decisions in which the Supreme Court 
resolved a case involving federal tax law on constitutional grounds.   
150 Id.  There are, however, cases involving state taxation that the Court decided on equal protection 
grounds:  Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989), 
(prohibiting non-uniform assessment of tax on real property); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of camp for non-residents of state while 
exempting real estate of camps for residents). supra note 20 discussed infra Part 3B. 
151 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (on foreseeability grounds). 
152 Untermyer v Anderson, 276 US 440 (1928). 
153 Darusmont v. United States, 449 US 292 (1981) (holding that retroactive imposition within a taxable 
year of the minimum tax on tax preference items constitutional).  See, generally, Charles B. Hochman, The 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of  Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960), and, 
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constitutional court, the U.S. Supreme Court has proven unsympathetic to applying equal 
protection analysis to the distributive effects of taxing statutes and has retreated from 
earlier application of due process analysis to retroactive application of tax law changes.   
 Most constitutional federal tax jurisprudence involving no criminal question 
developed in the early decades of the post Sixteenth Amendment years.  More than two-
thirds of the federal law, constitutional decisions date to 1940 or earlier.155  Of the post-
1940 decisions, fully one-third involve criminal matters while none of the 1940 or 
previous decisions resolves a criminal issue.156  Moreover, on federal questions, 
decisions predominantly have supported the government’s power to tax.  Taxpayers have 
won in the Supreme Court with constitutional arguments in only slightly more than ten 
percent of the cases that reached the Supreme Court (including the criminal cases).157
And the Supreme Court in more recent year has overruled or limited its early decisions 
that were favorable to the taxpayer.158  For example, the Court in 1988 firmly established 
the federal government’s power to tax interest that states pay on their indebtedness159 and 
Congress’ power to limit the statutory exemption for interest on state obligations.160
Taxpayers have enjoyed greater success in asserting limitations on a state’s power to tax 
residents and non-residents differently161 and transactions involving interstate 
commerce.162
A. Miscellaneous Taxpayer Successes.  The U.S. Constitution requires that Congress 
apportion direct taxes among the states.163  The Supreme Court resolved some of the 
uncertainty concerning the meaning of a direct tax as it rejected an early income tax 
insofar as it taxed income from real property.164  The Court held that a tax on real 
more recently, Brian E. Raftery, Comment: Taxpayers Of America Unite! You Have Everything To Lose - 
A Constitutional Analysis Of Retroactive Taxation, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 803 (1996). 
154 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (U.S., 1994) (holding that retroactive application of a technical 
correction to a tax statute denying taxpayer a deduction does not violate due process). 
155 Staudt and Wiedenbeck’s Supreme Court Tax Database, supra note 9. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001) (overruling Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) with 
respect to operation of the Compensation Clause.  See discussion infra in text accompanying note 182 
159 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 US 505 (1988), reh. den. 486 US 1062, discussed infra in text 
accompanying note 288. 
160 I.R.C. §103.  Interest on local government obligations is also exempt from federal income taxation under 
I.R.C. §103 as local governmental units derive their authority and are federal law considers them to be part 
of the state from which they derive their authority.  Jewell Cass Phillips, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA 36 (New York 1960). 
161 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (prohibiting taxing real estate of 
camp for non-residents of state while exempting real estate of camps for residents). supra note 20; 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985). (rejecting Alabama’s tax preference 
for in-state insurers, discussed infra Section 3C. 
162 National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (limiting the state’s power to 
impose collection responsibility for use taxes on non-resident vendors with no substantial presence in the 
state), supra note 21, discussed in Section 3D infra. 
163 Art. I, Sec. 2 [3] provides in part:  “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States … according to their respective Numbers ….”   
164 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).  
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property certainly was a direct tax and concluded that a tax on the income from real 
property was the same as a tax on the property itself.  Therefore it was a direct tax 
requiring apportionment.165   On rehearing, the Court extended its holding to income 
from personal property.166  Taxing that income also was a direct tax that, absent 
apportionment by population, the Constitution prohibited.167  However, enactment of the 
16th Amendment in 1913 removed the apportionment barrier to the income tax.168
 In an early post-16th Amendment decision, the definition of income confronted 
the Supreme Court.  In Eisner v. Macomber,169 a taxpayer successfully challenged 
imposition of an income tax on corporate dividends payable in the corporation’s own 
shares – so-called “stock dividends.”  Congress expressly included stock dividends in the 
tax base for the income tax, but the Court held that the 16th Amendment did not empower 
Congress to tax appreciation in the value of the taxpayer’s property before the taxpayer’s 
relationship to the property changed.170  It is the change in the taxpayer’s relationship to 
165 Id. at 583. 
166 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co. (rehearing), 158 US 601 622 (1895). 
167 Id. at 622. 
168 The 16th Amendment reads:  “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration.”   
 Recently, the subject of direct taxes and apportionment has reemerged and led to renewed debate 
among tax commentators with respect to proposals in Congress and among tax commentators advocating 
national sales taxes or other consumption taxes.  One commentator has argued that a consumption tax or 
value added tax might violate the apportionment requirement and is not covered by the 16th Amendment.  
Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the 16th Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 Ariz. St. L. J. 
1057 (2001).  Another disagrees and insists that the direct tax/apportionment restriction had to do with 
slavery and has no continuing significance.  Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock:  The Constitutionality 
of Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, Tax Notes 1723 (December 30, 2002).  Their debate continued in further 
in TAX NOTES in 2003.  Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, Tax Notes 821 (August 11, 
2003) and Calvin H. Johnson, Barbie Dolls in the Archeological Dig:  Professor Johnson Responds, Tax 
Notes 832 (August 11, 2003).  More recent additions to this discussion include Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting 
the Sixteenth Amendment (by Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 Const. Comm. 355 (2004), Erik M. 
Jensen, The Taxing Power: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Westport, 2005), 
Calvin Johnson, RIGHTEOUS ANGER OF THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION (Cambridge, 2005). Leo P. Martinez, The trouble with taxes: fairness, tax policy, and the 
Constitution. 31 Hastings Const. L.Q. 413-446 (2004). 
 Unclear from the language quoted in note 163 supra is whether a value added tax model of the 
consumption tax might be an indirect tax and not subject to apportionment at all, despite general 
acknowledgement that the burden of the tax fall upon the ultimate consumer of the goods or services that 
are subject to the tax, so long as its rate is uniform throughout the United States.  Art. I, Sec. 8 [1] of the 
U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to tax “but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States; ….”  Other consumption tax models tax income but defer the imposition of 
any tax when the taxpayer invests, rather than consumes, the income.    See discussion of the distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes supra note 50.   
169 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920).  For an extensive discussion of Macomber and the 
Constitution, see Henry M. Ordower, Revisiting Realization -- Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, 
Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 Virginia Tax Review 1 (1993).
170 In Macomber, id., a corporation distributed a stock dividend to all common shareholders of record in the 
corporation, so that each shareholder’s voting and participation rights remained unchanged despite the 
stock dividend.  The shareholders received no cash or other property.  The Court viewed taxing the 
distribution as taxing unrealized appreciation in the value of the shares. 
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the property that generates the taxable event.  When the taxpayer sells or exchanges the 
appreciated property, the taxpayer’s relationship to the property changes and a taxable 
event occurs.  Similarly, when, in the case of a stock dividend as in Macomber,171 the 
taxpayers’ rights relative to the rights of other shareholders change or may change, a 
taxable event occurs.172  Since the Supreme Court resolved the question in the taxpayer’s 
favor in Macomber on constitutional grounds, Congress nevertheless has taken several 
steps toward taxing unrealized appreciation in mark to market rules applicable to 
commodities contracts 173 and inventoried securities.174  Taxpayers have not challenged 
those statutes with the effort required to reach the Supreme Court and many 
commentators conclude that Macomber is no barrier to taxing unrealized appreciation.175
 While taxpayers consistently have lost federal tax cases in which they raised Bill 
of Rights claims,176 taxpayers in recent years have met somewhat greater success with 
other constitutional claims.  For example, the Supreme Court held that the Compensation 
Clause of the Constitution177 is no barrier to imposition of a non-discriminatory tax on 
federal employees and other citizens, including judges, because there is no risk that 
Congress might impose the tax to influence judicial decisions.178  In so holding, the Court 
overruled its earlier Compensation Clause decision that broadly prohibited imposing a 
new tax on judges’ salaries.179  The decision gave taxpayers a partial victory by 
permitting extension of the Medicare tax,180 but not the Social Security tax,181 to sitting 
federal judges.  The court distinguished the Medicare tax from the Social Security tax 
because the Social Security tax was discriminatory.  Most other federal employees could 
elect whether or not to participate in social security, but judges and a limited group of 
high-level federal employees were required to participate in Social Security.182
Similarly, taxpayers successfully argued that the ad valorem Harbor Maintenance Tax183
that the U.S. imposed on export shipments was indeed a tax184 that the Export Clause 
171 Id. 
172 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (holding a dividend of common stock on preferred to be 
taxable); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937), reh’g. denied, 302 U.S. 781 (1938) (holding a 
distribution of preferred shares on common where preferred shares were already outstanding to be taxable). 
173 IRC §1256.  
174 IRC §475 
175 See Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax:  Some Implications of the 
Recent Decisions, 35 Ill. L. Rev. NW. U. 779 (1941); more recently, Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive 
Account of the Realization Rule, 57 Tax L. Rev. 355 (2004) (arguing that a realization based tax system 
makes sense but rejecting any constitutional realization requirement; but missing absence of evidence of 
change in the Supreme Court’s view of the issue since Macomber).  And to the contrary, Ordower, 
Revisiting Realization, supra note 169. 
176 Infra discussion in section 3B. 
177 The Compensation Clause guarantees federal judges a "Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1. 
178 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (U.S., 2001). 
179 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). 
180 I.R.C. §3101(b)(4)-(6). 
181 I.R.C. §3101(a). 
182 United States v. Hatter, supra note 178, 532 U.S. at 576. 
183 I.R.C. §4461. 
184 United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998). 
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prohibited185 rather than user fees.  Likewise a nondiscriminatory federal excise tax on 
insurance premiums186 violated the export clause insofar as it reached insurance 
premiums paid on export shipments.187
B. Bill of Rights Decisions – Federal Law Challenges.  Taxpayers enjoyed early 
victories with Due Process Clause arguments against retroactive application of the gift 
and estate taxes to gifts the taxpayer completed before enactment of the tax.188  Those 
victories seem a function of lack of warning to taxpayers, rather than a reflection of a 
fundamental limitation on retroactive tax changes.  Hence, the Court distinguished a 
change in the estate tax base that included gifts in contemplation of death189 from the 
unanticipated, new tax, due process precedents.190  The Court observed that retroactive 
application of the change worked no injustice.  Gifts in contemplation of death were 
equivalent to transfers at death.  The taxpayer reasonably could have anticipated the risk 
that Congress would change the law to include gifts in contemplation of death, as many 
states already included such gifts in their inheritance tax base.191  Compare the Supreme 
Court’s early decision permitting the first, post-16th Amendment income tax statute to 
reach income the taxpayer realized during the taxable year before enactment of the statute 
but after adoption of the amendment to the Constitution.192  More recent decisions have 
given the United States still greater authority to impose tax law changes retroactively.  
For example, reduction of the decedent’s unified estate and gift tax credit193 for gift tax 
exemptions the taxpayer claimed under prior law was permissible194 even though the tax 
185 The Export Clause states: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." U.S. 
Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
186 I.R.C. §4371. 
187 United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843 (1996). 
188 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Untermyer v Anderson, 276 US 440 (1928), supra note 152 
(holding the imposition of the gift tax on gifts completed in the year of enactment of the gift tax but before 
introduction and enactment of the gift tax legislation to be impermissible retroactive taxation).  Similarly, 
Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927) (imposing estate tax on gifts completed before enactment but 
structured that they would come within the statutory inclusion of gifts intended to take effect on death 
impermissible as retroactive taxation). 
189 Congress has since substituted an objective three year of death rule for the subjective concept of a gift in 
contemplation of death.  I.R.C. §2035, as amended by P.L. 94-455, Sec. 2001(a)(5) (2d Sess. 1976).  
Compare, however, Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (rejecting a 6 year of death presumption 
of contemplation of death), Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (rejecting a 2 year of death 
presumption of contemplation of death).  The current federal statute makes no presumption of 
contemplation of death.  Rather it simply includes gifts made within 3 years of death in the decedent’s 
gross estate. 
190 Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).   
191 Id. at 22.  And similarly with inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the decedent’s estate when the 
decedent paid premiums.  United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).  But not where 
the right to proceeds of policies vested in the beneficiaries before enactment of the estate tax.  Lewellyn v. 
Frick, 268 U.S. 238 (1925)  
192 Brushaber v. Union Pacific RR, 240 US 1, 24 (1916) (permitting the first income tax act to tax incomes 
retroactively to the date earlier the same year that the 16th Amendment took effect) and Blodgett v. Holden, 
275 U.S. 142, supra note 188 (prohibiting retroactive application of the gift tax to a period before the 
Congress began to consider the tax) support this approach. 
193 I.R.C. §2010. 
194 United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986). 
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benefit of the claimed exemption disappeared as the gift became part of the decedent’s 
estate under the three year of death rule.195  In so holding, the Court expressly limited its 
earlier decisions to those instances in which the taxpayer had no notice of the change or 
contemplated change in the law before electing a course of action or Congress enacted a 
new tax.196  And in upholding a retroactive extension of a state income tax to dividends 
that previously had been exempt, the Court observed in alluding to the planning issue 
with a retroactive gift tax “[w]e can not assume that stockholders would refuse to receive 
corporate dividends even if they knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new 
tax …”197
 Congress generally seeks to avoid the potential retroactivity problem by 
announcing publicly proposed tax changes and making them effective no earlier that the 
date of that announcement.  However, where a taxpayer planned a transaction to exploit a 
flaw in a statute, neither the taxpayer’s planning nor the absence of a public 
announcement in advance of the effective date of the change was a barrier to retroactive 
application of the statute as changed.198 The statute in question and in effect at the 
decedent’s death allowed a deduction for one-half the value of employer securities that an 
estate sold to an employee stock option plan.199  The estate purchased shares on the 
market, sold them to an employee stock option plan and claimed the deduction – 
correctly applying the statutory provision as then in effect.  The retroactive statutory 
change limited the statute to sales of shares that were includible in the decedent’s estate, 
so the estate received no deduction.  The Court viewed the change as a rational limitation 
of the statute to those instances that Congress originally contemplated reaching with the 
benefit targeting transition of ownership from decedents to employees of the business in 
which the decedent was involved before death.  Retroactive application was modest and 
the change was not arbitrary.200
 Taxpayers have fared no better in the Supreme Court with First Amendment 
based, religious freedom tax claims than they have with due process claims.  With respect 
to the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,201 for example, the Supreme 
Court refused to exempt Amish taxpayers from the social security tax even though the 
Court acknowledged that their religious beliefs precluded the Amish from participating in 
any governmental social welfare system.202  Free exercise of their religion had to yield to 
the need for uniform, non-discriminatory taxation to provide a fiscally sound social 
195 I.R.C. §2035 includes completed gifts that the decedent made within three years of death in the 
decedent’s estate. 
196 United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 567-8 (distinguishing Blodgett v. Holden, supra note 188, 275 
U.S. 142, on the basis of surprise and limiting Untermyer v Anderson, supra note 188, 276 US 440 to 
enactment of wholly new taxes). 
197 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 148 (1938). 
198 United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). 
199 I.R.C. §2057 (repealed). 
200 United States v. Carlton, supra note 198, 512 U.S. at 32. 
201 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; ….”  U.S. Constitution Amendment I. 
202 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). 
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security system.203  The Court similarly determined that religious organizations 
advancing racial segregation principles operated contrary to public policy204 and 
accordingly were not entitled to tax exempt status.205  The Court held that the 
fundamental policy against racial discrimination means that “[r]acially discriminatory 
educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the 
‘charitable’ concept …” that tax exempt status requires.206
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed directly the issue of whether the 
subsidy provided to churches through the federal income tax deduction violates the 
principle of church-state separation under the First Amendment,207 it permitted New 
York’s exemption of churches from property taxes to stand despite the state subsidy 
inherent in the exemption.208  On balance, absence of an exemption might lead to greater 
state entanglement because “[e]limination of exemption would tend to expand the 
involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, 
tax foreclosures…”209  And the Court has acknowledged that there is a subsidy in the 
charitable contribution deduction, but it is neutral with respect to the issue of religious 
establishment as it provides deduction for gifts to all religious as well as many secular 
entities.210  Denial of the deduction for fixed fees for Scientology auditing, even if a 
fundamental religious practice, nevertheless was correct because the donor received a 
quid pro quo that is inconsistent with a charitable gift and similar to religious school 
tuition for which taxpayers receive no deduction.211
 Freedom of speech claims212 that a public interest, lobbying organization 
advanced in favor of its right to receive tax deductible contributions also failed to 
persuade the Supreme Court.213  The taxpayer enjoyed tax exempt status214 but its 
lobbying activities precluded it from securing that type of tax exempt status that would 
allow its donors a deduction for contributions to the organization.215  The Court also 
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the statute denied the organization equal protection 
203 Id. at 259-60. 
204 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
205 I.R.C. §501(c)(3).  Contributions to organizations that do not have tax exempt status under I.R.C. 
§501(c)(3) are not deductible by the donor. 
206 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, supra note 204, 461 U.S. at 595. 
207 I.R.C. §170 allows a federal income tax deduction for gifts to charities, including churches.   
208 Walz v. Tax Com. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674-5 (1970). 
209 Id.  
210 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (U.S., 1989).  
211 Id. at 693. 
212 “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech …”  U.S. Constitution Amendment I. 
213 Regan v. Taxation with Representation, supra note 148, 461 U.S. at 545 (1983) 
214 I.R.C. §501(c)(4) exempts not-for-profit organizations that promote social welfare, among other 
activities, from the federal income tax. 
215 Generally, I.R.C. §170(c)(2) limits the charitable contribution deduction to organizations that are public 
charities and exempt under I.R.C. §501(c)(3).  I.R.C. §501(c)(3) status is unavailable to any organization 
that devotes a substantial part of its activities to lobbying. 
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of the law216 relative to veterans’ organizations that could receive deductible 
contributions even though they engaged in lobbying.217  The Court deferred to Congress’ 
authority to discriminate among organizations to give a benefit so long as its basis for 
dissimilar treatment was rational.218  The Court observed that Congress may have chosen 
veterans’ organizations for additional tax benefits by making contributions to them 
deductible by the donor, despite the organizations’ lobbying, because of their members’ 
historical service to the country.219
C.  Bill of Rights Cases (Due Process and Equal Protection) – State Law Challenges.  The 
early twentieth century saw many challenges to state taxes that included or relied on 
claims that the state tax violated due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Those due process and equal protection arguments met greater success 
when advanced against state taxing statutes than they did against federal statutes although 
the Supreme Court deferred generally to the state legislatures’ choices with respect to 
their tax objects and structures.  Using its least intrusive standard of review, the “rational 
basis test,”220 the Supreme Court struck down state taxing schemes only when the 
justices thought the classifications of taxpayers and tax objects to be arbitrary.  The state 
could classify taxpayers and treat them differently from one another as long as it had a 
reasonable purpose for doing so.   
 While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the so-
called “marriage penalty”221 under the federal income tax,222 in Hoeper v. Tax 
216 U.S. Const. Amendment 14 reads in part:  “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”   
217 I.R.C. §170(c)(3) allows a charitable contribution deduction for gifts to veterans’ organizations, exempt 
under I.R.C. §501(c)(19), notwithstanding their lobbying activities.   
218 Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S. 540, supra note 148, at 550.  The type of 
distinction does not require “strict scrutiny,” that is, a more stringent review than “rational basis” that 
requires a compelling state interest in the classification. 
219 Id. at 550-1. 
220 On standard of review distinguishing the rational basis test from strict scrutiny that the Court applies to 
suspect classifications, see, generally, Lockhart et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 36, Ch. 10. 
221 Marriage penalty customarily refers to the additional tax that a married couple pays than two single 
individuals with the same combined income.  Thus, in a single income married household, joint filing 
permits income splitting and a lower tax than the comparable tax payable by an unmarried individual with 
the same income, but in a dual income married household, the combined income often causes the tax 
payable to be greater than the combined tax that two single individuals would pay.  Compare IRC §1(a) 
(joint filing) with IRC §1(c) (unmarried, single filing).  The rate bracket size for married individuals filing 
joint returns is less than twice the rate bracket size applicable to single individuals.  IRC §1(f)(8) phases out 
the marriage penalty for the 15% marginal bracket only.  The statute returns to its pre-2003 formulation, 
thereby restoring the marriage penalty at all brackets under the general sunset provision, section 901, of the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 107-16 (1st Sess. 2001).  Separate filing 
does not make the tax the same, as a separate rate bracket schedule applies to married individuals filing 
separate returns.  The brackets for that schedule are exactly one-half the married filing jointly brackets and 
preserves the marriage penalty.  IRC § 1(d). 
222 The Court denied certiorari in one instance.  Johnson v. United States, 422 F.Supp. 958 (N.Ill. 1976), 
aff’d.per curium sub. nom Barter v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 US 1012 (1978).  
One may not assume that the denial of a petition for certiorari discloses anything concerning the Supreme 
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Commission of Wisconsin,223 the Supreme Court determined that a Wisconsin joint 
income taxation statute violated the due process clause.  The statute in Hoeper required 
married couples to aggregate their incomes and pay tax according to a single rate 
schedule applicable to both single and married taxpayers.  Graduated surtaxes caused the 
amount of tax payable to be greater than it would have been had each spouse’s income 
been separate from the other spouse for tax purposes.  The court viewed the aggregation 
as causing one taxpayer to become subject to tax on another person’s income in violation 
of due process, as state law gave neither spouse an interest in the other’s income as 
community property law would.224
With three justices dissenting, the Supreme Court expressly upheld sex-based tax 
discrimination at state level against an equal protection argument in Kahn v. Shevin.225
There a widower unsuccessfully challenged Florida’s property tax exemption for widows, 
but not widowers.  The Court found that the disparity between women’s and men’s 
incomes provided a rational basis for the state distinguishing and providing a 
Court’s view as to the substance of the case.  Compare the German Constitutional Court’s prohibition of 
mandatory joint assessment in BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), discussed infra in text accompanying 
and following note 415.   
223 284 U.S. 206 (1931). 
224 Id. at 215.  Against the backdrop of Hoeper, the district court in Johnson v. United States, 422 F.Supp. 
958, supra note 222 carefully analyzed the federal marriage penalty against due process and equal 
protection arguments and concluded that the federal statute did not violate the Constitution.  The court 
distinguished the statute in Hoeper from the federal statute that did not require married taxpayers to 
aggregate their incomes.  Id.. at 967-8.  The leading Supreme Court precedents on the issue of the right to 
marry and privacy within marriage, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 US 479 (1965) (holding that 
the state may not restrict the freedom of the marital unit to use birth control devices), Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a statute that prohibited marriage between individuals of different races; 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (including the right to divorce within the fundamental right to 
marriage and limiting the application of a filing fee to indigent plaintiffs), led the court to conclude that 
marriage was a fundamental right, so the court had to apply strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause 
to the taxing statute as a burden on that right.  Id.. at 969-71.  The court noted, however, that the courts give 
particular deference to legislatures’ design of taxing statutes and noted further that the joint bracket 
schedule benefits some marriages while burdening others.  Id.. at 971-2.  And see note 221 supra on the 
marriage penalty.  Pointing out that statistical evidence demonstrates that most unmarried taxpayers do not 
live alone, the court handily rejected the government’s argument that married taxpayers enjoy economies 
from maintaining a single household and can afford, therefore, to pay a higher tax.  Id. at 972.   
Nevertheless, the district court upheld the statute.  Finding that the history of taxation provided the 
compelling interest necessary to support the burden on some married couples.  The first income-splitting 
statutes permitted married individuals to pay a tax of twice the tax imposed at single rates on one-half the 
marital unit’s combined income, thereby doubling the bracket size for the marital unit.  (Germany continues 
to employ that true income splitting scheme with double rate brackets under its income tax.  EStG §32a 
(5).)  As a result of that structure, unmarried individuals reached the next bracket at twice the rate as 
married individuals with identical income in single income marriages.  In order to diminish the disparity in 
income tax burden between single taxpayers and comparable single income marital units, Congress 
established the married filing jointly rate schedule.  Further, Congress sought to treat all marital units the 
same whether single or dual income units by adopting the married filing separately schedule.  The 
government’s objective to achieve those two goals provided a sufficiently compelling government interest 
to support the marriage penalty.  Johnson at 973.  Taxpayers’ appeal of the district court’s decision proved 
fruitless.  Aff’d.per curium sub. nom Barter v. U.S., 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 US 
1012 (1978). 
225 416 U.S. 351 (1974) . 
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discriminatory benefit for the class of widows in order to reduce ‘the disparity between 
the economic capabilities of a man and a woman.’226  In an earlier decision,227 the Court 
similarly upheld that a Georgia poll tax228 exemption for women, who do not vote, 
against equal protection challenge.  The Court viewed the poll tax exemption as rationally 
related to statutory economic responsibilities because under Georgia law men were 
financially responsible for the family and thus would bear both the wife’s and children’s 
poll tax burden.229  The appellant did not raise, nor did the Court address on its own, the 
issue of whether the tax exemption might discourage women from exercising their 
recently acquired franchise in order to avoid the tax.230  The Court did emphasize that, in 
the case, the poll tax was not a disguise in order to deny men the right to vote by making 
payment of the tax a condition to voting registration.231
Despite taxpayers’ failures to persuade the Supreme Court to invalidate statutes in 
several sex discrimination cases, there is a line of Supreme Court decisions prohibiting 
states from discriminating among classes of taxpayers.  The bulk of taxpayer successes in 
those cases involves classifications that discriminate against non-resident taxpayers.  Yet, 
there are several cases, like Hoeper,232 for which residence is not a factor.233  For 
example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission Of Webster County, 
West Virginia,234 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires that 
the county assess property for tax purposes substantially uniformly.  While no state 
statute specifically authorized the assessor to assess recently purchased properties at their 
arms’ length sale price but not increase assessments to reflect current market values of 
other properties, the assessor adopted that practice.  Hence taxes remained stable for 
properties that did not change ownership and increased for properties that changed 
ownership.  This practice created a large disparity in relative tax burden of similar 
properties in violation of equal protection.235  Later, when similar assessment disparities 
arose from Proposition 13 in California,236 the Court upheld the tax.237  The Court 
226 Id. at 352. 
227 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
228 A poll tax is a capitation tax.  Westin, supra note 81, at 529. 
229 Breedlove, supra note 227, 302 U.S. at 282.  The decision precedes most of the racial discrimination 
cases and includes language that later  decisions would eschew:  “[i]n view of burdens necessarily borne by 
them (men) for the preservation of the race, ….  Id.  The term “race” in the decision is probably racially 
neutral as referring to human race, although the appellant is:  “a white male citizen 28 years old.”  Id. at 
279. 
230 U.S. Const. Amendment 19, enacted in 1920, guarantees the right to vote without regard to sex.  
231 Breedlove, supra note 227, 302 U.S. at 284. 
232 Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, supra note 223. 
233 Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (holding, but on statutory, not equal 
protection grounds, that a state may not tax retired federal employees’ pensions while exemption retired 
state employees’ pensions). 
234 488 U.S. 336 (1989).  Compare the German Constitutional Court ruling the wealth tax unconstitutional 
because the valuation of real property failed to adjust for current market values, BVerfGE 93, 121, supra
note 28, discussed infra in Part 4E. 
235 Id. at 342-3. 
236 Proposition 13 was a voter initiative that added Article XIIIA to the California constitution in 1978.  
Article XIIIA limits ad valorem taxes to one percent of the cash value of the real property as fixed in the 
1975-6 assessment, subject to annual increase no greater than 2% per year.  Following a non-exempt 
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distinguished Allegheny determining that the Proposition 13 limitation that created the 
disparity had the rational purposes238 of preserving neighborhood stability and protecting 
existing owners from rapid increase in taxes.  A new owner did not require that protection 
because the new owner could decide not to buy in light of the expected increase in tax.239
Exclusions of specific types of workers and employers with fewer than eight 
employees from the Social Security tax and accompanying state unemployment taxes did 
not violate the equal protection clause because the exemptions bore a rational relationship 
to the purpose of the act.240  On the other hand, the Court rejected a distinction in a 
recording tax based upon the length of the mortgage and held the distinction between five 
years or more and less than five years to be arbitrary.241  Yet, the Court accepted the 
statute’s exemption, even for mortgages longer than five years, if the lender was a 
building and loan association.242  Similarly, a business tax imposed on the gross receipts 
of a corporation but not on the gross receipts of an individual engaged in the same 
business was not acceptable under the equal protection clause since it was arbitrarily 
discriminatory.243  And, likewise, disparity in voting rights on tax matters as function of 
property ownership did violate equal protection. 244
The Court has never held that equal protection requires vertical equity,245 so that 
equal protection neither demands progressivity nor prohibits regressivity in taxation.246
Both the federal government and the states have great flexibility in determining their 
rates and tax bases.  A progressive rate structure received express approval from the 
Court.247  And, without addressing the regressive impact of its rate structure, the Court 
transfer such as a gift from parent to child, reassessment to current cash value is permissible.  Article XIIIA 
also requires a vote of the people to approve any statutory tax increase in any California tax. 
237 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
238 The Court rejected any higher level of scrutiny than rational basis to support the constitutional provision 
and implementing statutes.  Id. at 11. 
239 Id.  The Court did not offer this latter rational in Allegheny.  Note that the property tax increase on sale 
should adversely affect the sale price, as the buyer will have to pay a comparatively high tax.  Moreover, 
the limit on assessment increases locks existing owners into their property, as moving within California is 
likely to cause them to pay materially higher real estate taxes. 
240 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513 (1937) (, for example, exempting 
agricultural workers may be rational because of the administrative difficulties of collection). 
241 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 38 (1928).
242 Id. at 40 (holding that the building and loan exemption serves the public purpose of encouraging home 
ownership). 
243Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 402 (1928). 
244 Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (rejecting the Texas dual box system that required approval of bond 
issues and taxes by two classes of voters, one class consisting of owners of property subject to assessment 
in the municipality and a second class composed of the first class plus all non-owners.  The system in effect 
provided super-voting rights to owners.) 
245 Tax concept that “people with greater ability to pay should pay higher taxes.”  Westin, supra note 81, at 
835. 
246 See, generally, Leo P. Martinez, The trouble with taxes: fairness, tax policy, and the Constitution. 31 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 413 (2004). 
247Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., supra note 192, 240 U.S. at 25 (1916).  
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also upheld the Social Security Act.248  In the 1930s, the Court heard a series of chain and 
department store cases that involved state taxes basing graduation upon the size or the 
enterprise measured by either revenue or number of stores in the chain.  In Stewart Dry 
Goods Co. v. Lewis,249 the Court took a harsh view of Kentucky’s graduated tax imposed 
on gross retail sales stating:  “the operation of the statute is unjustifiably unequal, 
whimsical and arbitrary,…”250  The Court distinguished a graduated rate structure 
applied to profit from one applicable to gross revenue because gross revenue provides no 
information about profit.  The state’s rationale that greater sales meant a greater ability to 
pay the tax was not rational.251  The Court expressed a strong preference for a graduated 
income tax or a flat rate sales tax.252  Similarly, the Court stuck down a license tax that 
increased in amount on all stores in a chain whenever the chain opened a store in another 
county.253  To the contrary, Justice Cardozo, who dissented in Stewart Dry Goods,254
wrote the majority opinion in Fox v. Standard Oil. Co. of New Jersey255 upholding West 
Virginia’s graduated, flat license tax, the amount of which per unit increased with the 
number of units in the chain of vendors.  The Court considered the increase rationally 
related to the benefits that a member of a chain derives from the chain organization.256
Similarly, a graduated fee based upon the number of stores under the same ownership and 
management withstood challenge as well.257
The equal protection clause has played a greater role with respect to 
discrimination based upon residence. A New Mexico statute that provided an annual 
property tax exemption to Vietnam war veterans who were resident in the state on a 
specific date discriminated against non-residents who later became residents and denied 
equal protection to those veterans.258  Similarly, while a retaliatory tax on out of state 
insurers passed equal protection examination,259 an Alabama gross premiums tax that 
imposed a higher rate on out of state insurers in order to promote Alabama-based 
businesses violated equal protection standards.260  Unlike the California tax that was 
designed to promote interstate commerce by discouraging other states from imposing 
higher taxes on out of state insurers, Alabama’s domestic preference tax created barriers 
248 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 17, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 
(1937).  And see discussion of the regressive structure of the tax supra in Part 2. 
249 Supra note 129, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). 
250 Id. at 557. 
251 Id. at 559. 
252 Id. at 563. 
253 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
254. Supra note 129, 294 U.S. at 566 (1935). 
255 294 U.S. 87 (1935). 
256 Id. at 97. 
257 State Board of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931). 
258 Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985). 
259 Western and Southern Life Insurance Company v. State Board of Equalization of California, supra note 
19, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).  The case also establishes that discriminatory classifications of taxpayers require 
only a rational state interest and basis to withstand constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection 
clause rather than meeting a higher standard of constitutional review. Id. at 657. 
260 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, supra note 161, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).  And, similarly, 
Wheeling Steel corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (invalidating Ohio’s ad valorem tax on intangible 
property of a foreign corporation despite the statute’s reciprocity provision). 
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to entry into the Alabama market that were “purely and completely discriminatory” 
against out of state insurers.261  Moreover, the Court observed that the domestic 
preference tax bore no rational relationship to the state’s objectives.  While the structure 
of the tax encouraged out of state insurers to invest in Alabama assets by reducing the tax 
rate relative to the level of Alabama investment, it did not require Alabama insurers to 
invest in Alabama assets at all.262
But even in those cases where geography is critical, the Court is reluctant to reject 
a state taxing scheme for which it can find a rational basis.  When the tax scheme 
discriminates against in state taxpayers in order to encourage investment by out of state 
taxpayers by exempting them from tax, the Court finds no equal protection violation.263
Similarly, when the tax discrimination directly affects residents and only incidentally 
non-residents because it favors in state business, the Court has relied on state legislatures’ 
knowledge of local conditions and collection opportunities to uphold the tax.264  And an 
exemption from use tax for natural gas that local distribution companies enjoy while 
natural gas from both in-state and out of state independent producers is not exempt 
withstood equal protection challenge.  The Court was unwilling to entertain the 
taxpayer’s argument that natural gas from an out of state local distribution company 
would be subject to use tax and held that the exemption was permissible regulation of 
natural gas distribution in order to protect that market.265
In an earlier decision, the Court found a rational basis in Vermont’s efforts to 
achieve a very rough equivalence between dividends from domestic corporations that 
were subject to Vermont franchise tax and foreign corporations that were not.  Only 
dividends from foreign corporations were subject to income tax in Vermont.  Yet, the 
discrimination against those dividends met equal protection standards because exempt 
Vermont dividends had borne an equivalent indirect tax burden through the franchise 
tax.266  The Court observed:  “absolute equality in taxation cannot be obtained, and is not 
required under the Fourteenth Amendment.”267  In the same case, however, the Court 
held that Vermont’s exemption of interest earned from Vermont loans from tax 
discriminated against out of state loans in violation of the equal protection clause.268
Several decisions address challenges to formulary apportionment methods that 
states use to reach part of the income of out of state taxpayers.  The Court held 
apportionment of railroad revenue based on the ratio of in state freight car miles to 
system car miles, to be an acceptable method under equal protection challenge.269  More 
261 Id. at 878. 
262Id. at 882-3.  
263 Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (exempting out of state taxpayers who store 
goods in Ohio from personal property tax). 
264 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940) (upholding a tax on out of state bank deposits fivefold as great 
as the tax on in state deposits). 
265 GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 306 (1997). 
266 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935). 
267 Id. at 422. 
268 Id. at 425. 
269 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940). 
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recently, Michigan’s single business tax270 apportionment value added withstood both 
due process and commerce clause challenge that it discriminated against interstate 
commerce.271  The formula was internally consistent.272  The Court approved the three 
factor formula for income 273 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws adopted it for income that the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes 
Act apportions.274  Since the tax is a tax on business operation in Michigan, the 
apportionment formula is not unfair.275
D. Commerce Clause Decisions.  Many of the state taxation, equal protection cases 
include claims under the Commerce Clause as well.  Application of the Commerce 
Clause to taxation matters conceptually overlaps due process and equal protection to 
prevent several states from unfairly taxing the same resources.  Accordingly, the taxpayer 
must have sufficient contacts with the state to become subject to the state’s taxing 
authority.276  This requirement of sufficient contact with the state became particularly 
important to the increasing volume of internet commerce.  Congress, under the 
Commerce Clause, imposed a moratorium on taxation of internet activities that limits the 
states’ authority to impose tax on internet access.277  The Multistate Tax Commission 
opposes extension of the moratorium, as well as further restrictions on the states’ taxing 
authority.278
 Taxpayers do win in the Supreme Court on Commerce Clause grounds when the 
state statute favors in-state over out of state taxpayers so long as the reason for the 
270 Mich. Comp. Laws §208.1 (2005), (repealed for years beginning after 2009), as in effect at the time of 
the case, imposed a value added tax that apportions the value added that is subject to tax in Michigan for 
taxpayers operating in more than one state based upon three factors:  property, payroll and sales. 
271 Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991). 
272 Id. at 380. 
273 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942). 
274 7A U. L. A. 331 (1990 Cum. Supp.) (approved in 1957 by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association). 
275 Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. at 380. 
276 For example, National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, supra note 21, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and 
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (prohibiting a state from requiring an out-of-state 
vendor having an insufficient nexus with the state to pay use taxes on its sales into the state.  The vendor 
had not permanent establishment in the state). 
277 Internet Tax Freedom Act. Act Oct. 21, 1998, P.L. 105-277, Div C, Title XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719; Nov. 
28, 
   2001, P.L. 107-75, § 2, 115 Stat. 703, provides:  
      "Sec. 1100. Short title.  
      "This title may be cited as the 'Internet Tax Freedom Act'.  
      "Sec. 1101. Moratorium.  
      "(a) Moratorium. No State or political subdivision thereof shall impose any of the following taxes 
during the 
   period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending on November 1, 2003--  
         "(1) taxes on Internet access, unless such tax was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to 
   October 1, 1998; and  
         "(2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. 
278 Eric Parker, MTC to Congress:  Stop Federal Preemption on Internet Tax Issues, 108 TAX NOTES 630 
(2005) (reporting on Multistate Tax Commission opposition to pending legislation). 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 29 
discrimination is to favor in-state individuals and businesses.  For example, Hawaii’s 
liquor excise tax discriminated against out of state producers in violation of the 
Commerce Clause.279  But Michigan’s flat registration fee for trucks making deliveries in 
Michigan did not burden commerce.  Taxpayers argued that the fee economically 
discriminated against truckers who made few deliveries in Michigan, as Michigan did not 
apportion the fee based upon mileage or some economic measure of the usage of 
Michigan roads.280
 In addition, there is a line of cases under the Commerce Clause that distinguishes 
unitary from non-unitary business.281  In the case of a unitary business, the state may 
apportion the taxpayer’s income from its entire unitary business and tax the apportioned 
amount.282  If the business is not unitary, the state may tax only the income attributable to 
activities within the state.283
E. State-federal taxing issues.  The federal government’s power to tax states and the 
states’ power to tax the federal government have been issues of controversy over the 
years.  The progression of cases demonstrates the Supreme Court’s retreat from its early, 
broad-based rejection of inter-governmental taxation.  Early Supreme Court decisions 
reflected the concern that the power to tax gave the federal government the power to 
control or destroy state and local governments, and conversely.  An early case,284 held the 
Income Tax Act of 1894 unconstitutional as it taxed the interest on state and local bonds.  
In that case, the Court saw no difference between taxing income and taxing the source of 
the income and held that Congress lacked the power to tax municipal bonds.285
Subsequently, the Court held that taxing gain from the sale of state bonds, the interest on 
which was exempt from tax, would not undermine the state’s ability to borrow or cost of 
borrowing.286  More recently, the Supreme Court overruled that part of the holding in 
279 Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).  The Court applied this rule retroactively to Georgia’s 
excise tax in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). 
280 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005). 
281 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 781 (U.S. 1992) (finding no unitary 
business and relying on the indicia of a unitary business:  functional integration, centralization of 
management and economies of scale).  See, generally, Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein, STATE 
AND LOCAL TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 562-565 (St. Paul 2001) (offering various formulations of 
the unitary business principle, not necessarily requiring operational interdependence but some integration 
of activities).   
282 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (California’s formulary 
apportionment of worldwide income permissible and fair as applied to a domestic corporation): Barclays 
Bank Plc v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (same, as applied to both domestic subsidiary of a 
foreign corporation and foreign corporation with foreign parent doing business in California).  See, note 
274 supra and accompanying text for the three factor apportionment method. 
283 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, supra note 281, 504 U.S. 768; Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (rejecting the state’s attempt to apportion income from intangibles 
that were not part of a unitary business). 
284 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 US 429, reh., 158 U.S. 601, supra note 164. 
285 Id. at 619.  “…so far as this law operates on the receipts from municipal bonds, it cannot be sustained, 
because it is a tax on the power of the States, and on their instrumentalities to borrow money, and 
consequently repugnant to the Constitution.”  Id. at 630. 
286 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 229 (1931). 
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Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust287 and determined that Congress could choose to tax 
interest on state obligations.288
 Taxation of the compensation of state employees followed a like development.  
Initially, the Court determined that taxing the salary of a state judge was impermissible 
taxation of the state, authority that the Constitution reserved to the state itself.289
Similarly, the Court held that a state may not tax an employee of the federal 
government.290  But the Court gradually narrowed the limitation291 and ultimately 
overruled its early decisions, determining that intergovernmental tax immunity 
doctrine292 was no barrier to a non-discriminatory tax on the salaries of federal 
employees.293  Such a non-discriminatory tax poses no threat to governmental 
functions.294  If, however, the tax discriminates in favor of employees of the state taxing 
government or against employees of federal government, it is unconstitutional not as a 
matter of equal protection, but because of the intergovernmental tax immunity 
principle.295  Discriminatory taxes potentially do undermine governmental functions by 
placing a greater burden on them than on state functions. 
F. “Frivolous” Constitutional Arguments.  Many constitutional claims that the 
German Constitutional Court might decide never reach the Supreme Court because the 
U.S. Supreme Court has greater control over its docket than does the German 
Constitutional Court.296  Even if a taxpayer makes a strong constitutional argument, the 
taxpayer may not compel the Supreme Court to hear the argument.297  Lower courts 
reject religious freedom arguments298 and protester arguments against the validity of the 
income tax and social security tax.299
 The trend in the Supreme Court seems non-interventionist.  Legislatures are best 
suited to make decisions with respect to tax classifications and structures.  While the 
Court continues to accept cases where there is a conflict in the circuits concerning the 
287 Supra note 164. 
288 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 US 505, 525 supra note 159. 
289 Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 128 (1871). 
290 New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
291 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (permitting taxation of income from government 
contracts –federal); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (likewise – state). 
292 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (prohibiting the state of Maryland from taxing a United 
States bank).
293 Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 483 (1939). 
294 Id.at 484-5. 
295 Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817 (1989) (holding that exemption of state retirees’ 
pensions from the state income taxing while taxing federal retirees’ pensions violates the constitutional 
principle of intergovernmental tax immunity). 
296 Supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
297 See discussion of discretionary jurisdiction by writ of certiorari supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
298 In Graves v. Commissioner, 579 F2d 392 (CA6 1978), cert. denied, 440 US 946 (1979) (religious 
convictions against war did not support Quakers’ claim for a war tax credit). 
299 Broad range of cases.  See, generally, Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: 
The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric In America, 50 Buffalo L. Rev. 819 (2002). 
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interpretation of a tax statute,300 the Constitution generally no longer comes into play 
unless a state taxing statute treats out-of-state taxpayers301 or federal employees 
materially less favorably than its residents or state employees.302
Part 4.  Germany – Human Dignity, Equal Rights and Due Process Tax Decisions 
 As the U.S. Supreme Court applies an unintrusive, rational basis review to 
constitutional questions in tax controversies,303 the German Constitutional Court 
examines tax legislation with a more critical eye.  Unlike the Supreme Court’s inactive 
role at the intersection of taxation and constitutional law development, the Constitutional 
Court has been instrumental in shaping fundamental elements of German income tax 
law304 and has prompted the legislature to abolish wealth, gift and inheritance taxes.305
The Supreme Court has grafted few constitutional limitations onto federal and state 
governments’ taxing authority.  Only the most arbitrary legislative selections of structure, 
base or taxpayer classifications fail to meet the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
examination.  Dissimilarly, the German Constitutional Court has applied Germany’s 
basic law expansively and comprehensively to tax controversies.  The court aggressively 
limits legislative authority in tax matters.  The Constitutional Court has actively reviewed 
German federal tax legislation and has identified numerous basic law limitations upon the 
German Parliament’s freedom to structure tax legislation, including a strict concept of 
equality in taxation under horizontal equity principles.  But, while mindful of issues of 
vertical equity, the Constitutional Court has not read the Basic Law to require vertical 
equity; so that both progressive tax structures like the income tax and regressive tax 
structures like the turnover tax inhere simultaneously in the German tax law.306
A. Disposable Income – Equal Rights and Human Dignity.  The first article of the 
Basic Law protects human dignity:  “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable.  To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”307  Combined with the social state 
principle,308 the Constitutional Court determined that the state must guarantee each 
citizen a subsistence amount consistent with human dignity.309  On the tax side, this 
300 Supreme Court Rule 10, supra note 8. 
301 Part 3C supra.
302 Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, supra note 295, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) 
303 Supra Part 3. 
304 Part 4A infra. 
305 BVerfGE 93, 121 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senat) (holding that the valuation principles of the wealth tax 
violate Art 3 (equal rights) and the tax is confiscatory in violation of Art. 14 (property rights guarantee) as 
it applies to unproductive property); BVerfGE 93, 165 (June 22, 1995, 2d Senat) (holding that valuation 
principles in inheritance and gift tax laws inconsistent with Art. 3 (equal rights) as they do not reflect 
current values of all properties fairly).  Discussion infra Part 4E.  See also Thuronyi, supra note 39, at 329-
30. 
306 See discussion supra in Part 2. 
307 Basic Law Art. 1 para. 1. 
308 Basic Law Art. 20 para. 1. 
309 BVerfGE 40, 121, 133 (June 18, 1975) (determining that the employment insurance fund need not 
provide for disabled orphans beyond age 25 and allowing the legislature to determine how to provide 
assistance to such individuals so long as each citizen receives social assistance to provide a subsistence 
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principle that the state has a duty to assure each citizen “the basic needs for a humane and 
dignified existence”310 grew into a limitation on the power of the state to tax non-
disposable income.  As the discussion in the succeeding paragraphs clarifies, non-
disposable income is that portion of the citizen’s income that the citizen must dedicate to 
providing the family with the necessities of life.  Expenditures necessary to producing the 
income diminish income available for necessities.  
 A recent decision of the Constitutional Court develops from and elaborates upon 
the constitutional protection of non-disposable income.311  Under the German income tax 
law, taxpayers who maintain a second household because their place of employment is 
remote from the location of their principal residence may deduct the duplicative living 
expenses as an expense of income production.312  Similarly, taxpayers who receive 
supplementary payments from their employers to compensate for the additional cost of a 
second household when the employer assigns the employee temporarily to a remote 
location may exclude the payments from their income.313  In 1995, effective for the tax 
year 1996, the legislature added a durational limit to the deduction or exclusion, so that 
expenditures for the second residence after two years of employment at the remote 
location ceased to be deductible and supplementary payments ceased to be excludable.314
Designed to limit revenue loss from the dual household deduction and the exclusion from 
income of the supplementary payments, the durational limit assumed that taxpayers 
ordinarily would relocate their permanent residence to the employment location when the 
term of employment became permanent.  More than two years suggests permanence and 
predominating personal rather than business reasons for continuing dual household 
maintenance.315  United States tax law follows a similar pattern with respect to the 
deduction for temporary living expenses while an individual is away from home on 
business although the durational limit in a single location is one year.316  However, unlike 
consistent with human dignity), and, from the tax perspective, see BVerfGE 82, 60, 85, discussed in detail 
infra commencing with the text accompanying note 353 (requiring the exemption of a subsistence 
minimum from the income tax).  An early case, however, did not support the premise of a state subsistence 
guarantee.  BVerfGE 1, 97, 104 (December 19, 1951, 1st Senat) (denying a remedy under the human 
dignity, equality, family protection and social state principles for inadequate social welfare assistance to a 
war widow with dependent children who was unable to work).  
310 BVerfGE 40 at 133 translating “die Mindestvoraussetzungen für ein menschenwürdiges Dasein.” 
311 BVerfGE 107, 27 (December 4, 2002).   
312 EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 5. 
313 Family separation payments (Trennungszuschläge) that do not exceed the amount deductible for 
duplicative living expenses are excludable. EStG § 3 Nr. 13.   
314 Id. and EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 5.   
315 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 37 (discussing the reasoning of the Federal Financial Court (Bundesfinanzhof) for 
rejecting the taxpayers’ appeals of adverse lower court rulings).  The Federal Financial Court 
(Bundesfinanzhof) is the highest appellate court for tax matters. 
316 IRC § 162(a)(2).  U.S. taxpayers may deduct their expenses for meals and lodging when they are away 
from home on business.  While the U.S. statute addresses the matter as expenses of travel away from home 
on business and does not grant expressly a duplicative living expense deduction, the statute limits the 
concept of temporarily away from home on business to a one year duration.   
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Germany, the United States allows no deduction to a U.S. taxpayer who changes her 
permanent place of employment even if separated from her family.317
 A married taxpayer whose principal place of employment differed from his 
spouse’s principal place of employment successfully challenged the deduction’s 
durational limit.  The taxpayer was a professor who changed positions from a university 
in Frankfurt (Main), Germany to Berlin, Germany, but whose self-employed wife, for 
valid business reasons, retained her geographical center of business activity and 
household in Frankfurt.318  The professor maintained a secondary, smaller residence in 
Berlin and sought to deduct his expenses for maintaining the secondary residence and for 
weekly trips home to Frankfurt.319  In a companion case, the taxpayer was a criminal 
commissioner whom the state of Rhineland-Palatinate assigned to a national office in 
Berlin320 and who received a separation payment from the state that the taxpayer sought 
to exclude from income.321  In both instances, the Constitutional Court concluded that the 
durational limitation violated the equality principle of the Basic Law.322
The Constitutional Court’s decision built upon a fifty-year decisional history 
under the equality principle.  While the court identified the fundamental taxation 
guidelines of horizontal and vertical equity that emanate from the equality principle and 
should drive taxation structures, only horizontal equity was critical to fair taxation.323
Vertical equity is important to the income tax classification but impractical for other tax 
bases.324  The court expressed the function of the guidelines as follows:   
in the interests of constitutionally mandated equality of tax burden …, 
taxpayers who have the same ability to pay should be taxed equally 
(horizontal tax equity), while (in the vertical direction) taxation of higher 
incomes should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes.325
317 Id.  After a year at most, the taxpayer’s tax home shifts to the place of employment.  Note, however, that 
Germany views some expenses as related to income production and deductible that the U.S. views as 
wholly personal and non-deductible, commuting expenses for example.  Compare treas. reg. §1.162-2(e) 
with EStG §9 ¶1, Nr. 4. 
318 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 35.   
319 EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5.in addition to the deduction for duplicative living expenses allows a deduction for the 
cost of travel to the principal residence and back to the place of employment weekly.   
320 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 35-6.   
321 EStG §3, Nr. 13.  The separation payment is one to compensate the taxpayer for duplicative living 
expenses when the assignment is not sufficiently permanent to support permanent relocation. 
322 The equality principle (German:  Gleichheitssatz) is in Art. 3, Para. 1 of the Basic Law and reads as 
follows:  “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the law.” 
323 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 46-7. 
324 Id.  The court may emphasize income taxation because the case before it is an income tax case but, more 
likely, because other taxes, especially the turnover tax, by their nature tend to be regressive and, 
accordingly, vertically inequitable.  See discussion of regressivity in the German tax system supra in Part 
II.  
325 Id.at 46.  Author’s translation.  Emphasis added. 
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Within the context of horizontal equity, the court determined that comparison of 
taxpayers’ ability to pay is a function of net income.326  In determining net 
income, expenditures necessary to production of income generally are 
deductible327 but not expenditures that, while incidental and helpful to income 
production, relate to the taxpayer’s specific standard of living and personal 
choices.328  For example, a taxpayer may deduct duplicative living expenses 
necessary to employment at a location remote from home.329  Yet, the allowable 
deduction may not exceed some average or customary level of living expenses 
that does not take the taxpayer’s individual standard of living choices into 
account, even if extravagant or luxurious expenditures are more consistent with 
the taxpayer’s general standard of living and possibly necessary in order to meet 
the expectations of the taxpayer’s business contacts.  The court viewed the excess 
expenditures over some general standard of living as discretionary and non-
deductible rather than deductible mandatory expenditures.330
 The dichotomy between mandatory and discretionary expenditures, according to 
the court, determined the permissibility of the state’s taking the funds through taxation 
that the taxpayer otherwise would devote to the expenditure.331  Although ordinary living 
expenditures generally are not deductible,332 citing its earlier decisions, the court pointed 
out that aspects of childcare and education expenditures are not discretionary and, 
accordingly, funds necessary for them not taxable to the degree that fully discretionary 
funds are.333  With respect to income production, certain expenditures that are personal in 
nature are essential, that is non-discretionary, to income production and, therefore, 
deductible.  As an example, commuting expenses are deductible although the selection of 
the location of one’s residence, and, indirectly commuting cost, is personal.334
326 Id.at 47. 
327 EStG §9. 
328 EStG §12 Nr. 1 (disallowing deduction for expenditures associated with the taxpayer’s standard of 
living even if they contribute to the production of income). 
329 EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5. 
330 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 48. 
331 The mandatory, and, therefore, non-taxable expenditures group themselves around a subsistence 
minimum that the court discusses in detail in its decision, BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d 
Senat), infra note 381, and accompanying text. 
332 EStG §12, Nr. 1. 
333 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 49.  The court cites its earlier decisions at BVerfGE 89, 246, 253, discussed infra in 
text accompanying note 395, (accepting an incremental needs standard in fixing the subsistence minimum 
that the income tax must exempt, while the social welfare system used a per capita system) and BVerfGE 
82, 60, 86, discussed infra note 353 and accompanying text (observing that a subsistence minimum must 
remain free from the income tax).  By comparison, the United States takes an ambiguous approach to 
childcare expenditures, allowing a credit for a portion of dependent care expenses for some taxpayers under 
IRC §21. 
334 Id. at 50.  EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 4 permits a deduction for commuting costs.  Under U.S. tax law, commuting 
costs are personal and non-deductible.  Treas. reg. §1.162-2(e).  Parking expense, however, is deductible if 
the employer arranges for the employee to pay for parking through a compensation reduction arrangement 
under IRC §132(f)(4).   
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 The preceding analysis took the court to the duplicate living expense issue.  The 
Finance Committee of the Bundesrat that introduced the two-year time limitation saw 
deductibility of temporary living expenses of a second household as a matter of 
legislative grace recognizing the business necessity that affects ability to pay tax.  On the 
other hand, the Committee saw attribution of long-term dual housekeeping at a single 
work location to business necessity to be a fiction.335
The Constitutional Court, however, considered the two-year durational limit to be 
inconsistent with business reality in the case of the criminal commissioner because the 
court was unable to distinguish multiple extensions of a taxpayer’s assignment to a single 
work location336 from a series of assignments lasting more than two years in the 
aggregate to a series of different locations.  In both instances, the uncertainty of 
temporary assignments rendered permanent relocation impractical.337  Since the statutory 
distinction between a single location and multiple locations caused the deduction 
limitation to treat similar abilities to pay dissimilarly by treating the multiple location 
worker more favorably than the multiply assigned, single location worker, that statutory 
distinction violated the equality principle.338
 The two-year durational limitation on the deduction for dual household costs also 
was flawed as it applied to married individuals both of whom work outside the home.339
If the spouses’ principal occupation locales differ, the expense of maintaining a second 
household is an income production expense that the tax law must take into consideration 
without regard to the duration of the arrangement.  The court compared two families with 
similar spousal combined earnings.  Both families may incur duplicative living expenses 
in order to produce income when one spouse changes his or her place of employment.  
Initially, the tax law acknowledges that the dual expense is a cost of producing income 
and allows a deduction.340  The single earner family may eliminate the duplication 
because the family may relocate to the new place of employment.  If the family chooses 
to continue to maintain a dual residence, the dual residence expenditure is clearly 
discretionary.  On the other hand, maintenance of dual residences is mandatory for the 
dual earner family so long as the spouses’ respective places of employment differ from 
one another.  Accordingly, a two-year durational limit to the deduction was not rational, 
as it limited a deduction for non-discretionary expenditures necessary to the continued 
production of income.  By treating discretionary and non-discretionary expenditures the 
same, the tax law failed to distinguish between dissimilarly situated taxpayers and 
violated the Basic Law’s equality principle.341   So while the statute purported to treat the 
335 Id. 
336 The commentary on the case refers to it as the Kettenabordnung decision (chain delegation or 
assignment decision) because it involves the several delegations of the taxpayer to the same work locale but 
no permanent assignment.  The court uses the term “Kettenabordnung” in referring to the criminal 
commissioner’s serial assignments.  Id. at 52. 
337 Id.   
338 Basic Law Art. 3 Para. 1. 
339 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 52-3. 
340 EStG §9, ¶1, Nr. 5. 
341 Basic Law Art 3. 
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families identically, it failed to account for a material and non-discretionary 
expenditure.342  With respect to other non-discretionary expenditures, the tax law 
permitted deductions to both spouses for other duplicative career expenditures such as 
commuting expenses.343
 While the equality principle may have sufficed to enable the Constitutional Court 
to find the durational limit for dual household expenses unconstitutional in both cases, the 
court, nevertheless, relied heavily in the two career case on the family and marriage 
protection principle in rendering its decision.344  Insofar as the durational limit assumes 
that the family normally would move to the work location of one spouse, it denies the 
family the ability to create its own structure.  Ability to relocate is a function of the 
specific marital model that includes only a single wage earner.345  The court rejected such 
a model as a justification for tax rules four decades earlier.346  The court concluded that 
tax legislation must respect the basic right of families to select their own structures, dual 
earner or single earner, and treat all the structures the same based upon ability to pay 
given the freely chosen structure.347
 How far taxpayers will push the limits of the decision should prove interesting.  
The court’s language on both the mandatory-discretionary distinction is broad, as is its 
language on freedom to structure the family.  Taxpayers seem likely to test the mandatory 
expenditure analysis by claiming a miscellany of essential payments as mandatory and 
deductible.  In the U.S. a taxpayers’ organization would quickly emerge to finance 
litigation to expand the scope of the deductible, mandatory expenditure concept.  
Similarly, a variety of family structures would soon claim deductions for duplicative 
living expenses.  Claim of a deduction for the continued maintenance of separate 
residences for couples who are working in different locations at the time of marriage 
seems a logical next step. 
Nevertheless, the dual household case broadened the range of expenditures that 
the court viewed as non-discretionary and, accordingly, not subject to the income tax.348
Earlier Constitutional Court decisions distinguished mandatory or non-discretionary 
expenditures from discretionary expenditures that constitute disposable income.349  From 
an American perspective, those decisions reached the remarkable conclusion that, while 
the income tax may burden disposable income freely, income that a taxpayer must devote 
to meeting the basic needs of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s family is exempt from 
342 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 52-3. 
343 EStG §9, ¶1 Nr.4. 
344 Basic Law Art. 6, Para. 1 provides:  “[m]arriage and family shall be under the special protection of the 
state.” 
345 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 53. 
346 BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957), infra note 415 and accompanying text (prohibiting mandatory joint 
assessment of married individuals to produce a marriage penalty from a differential rate schedule). 
347 BVerfGE 107, 27 at 56.  The court also reserved judgment as to whether or not the durational limit 
might violate Basic Law Art. 12 para. 1 (protecting the individual’s right to choose a profession freely) and 
Basic Law Art. 3 para 2 (guaranteeing equal rights without regard to sex). 
348 Supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
349 BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990, 1st Senat) and BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat).   
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taxation.  The leading case from a decade earlier than the dual household expense case 
required that the legislature exempt a subsistence minimum for each individual and 
family from the income tax.350  In the United States, by contrast, the general rule is that 
personal, living, or family expenses are not deductible, whether or not essential.351  The 
legislature may choose to tax gross income and allows deductions only as a matter of its 
beneficence.352
The earlier of the decisions addresses the question whether the equality and 
family protection principles of the Basic Law require that measurement of income for 
income tax and social welfare program purposes be consistent with one another.353  The 
Constitutional Court acknowledged that the underlying policies that fix the tax and 
welfare structures may differ from one another and apply differing income measurements 
in order to achieve the policy goals of the laws.354  The social program involved in the 
case subsidized families with children with a direct payment per child – a child 
supplement.  The cash subsidy complemented the exemption for children in the income 
tax law and provided families with additional resources.355  While all families with 
children received the subsidy, families with greater incomes received only the base 
amount subsidy while families with lower incomes received the base amount plus an 
additional subsidy.356  The statute that determined the amount of the subsidy measured 
income differently from the income tax law.  Specifically, the subsidy statute determined 
the individual’s subsidy amount by aggregating his positive income from the various 
income groups under the income tax law but, unlike the income tax law, permitted neither 
the loss from one income group to offset the income from other groups nor the losses of 
the individual’s spouse to offset the individual’s income.357
The individual challenging the statute before the Constitutional Court suffered a 
loss from his leasing activities.  While the loss was deductible across income groups for 
income tax computations, it was not deductible in determining his income for purposes of 
fixing the child supplement.358  Accordingly, he received only the base amount of the 
350 BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat).  This Article discusses this decision in some detail 
infra commencing with the text accompany note 381.   
351 IRC §262.  On the other hand, Congress exercised its “legislative grace” and allowed various 
deductions, including personal exemptions and a minimum standard deduction.  IRC §63. 
352 The longstanding premise underlying tax deductions is:  “[t]he power to tax income … is plain and 
extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon 
legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.  New 
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (U.S. 1934). 
353 BVerfGE 82, 60 (May 29, 1990, 1st Senat). 
354 BVerfGE 82 at 102. 
355 The Constitutional Court addresses itself directly to the exemption for children in BVerfGE 82, 198 
(June 12, 1990, 1st Senat), discussed in text commencing with note 376 infra. 
356 Id. at 63. 
357 The German income tax separates sources of income into seven groups and determines and combines 
the net income within each source group to form the tax base.  EStG §2(1).  With specific limits based upon 
the taxpayer’s aggregate income, the taxpayer may deduct losses from one source group in whole or part 
against income from other source groups and may deduct his or her spouse’s losses from the taxpayer’s 
otherwise positive income in determining income subject to tax.  EStG §2(3). 
358 BVerfGE 82 at 65.   
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child supplement rather than the larger supplement he would have received with the 
diminished income.  The Minister for Youth, Family and Health argued successfully that 
the reduction in the child supplement should be a function of economic income rather 
than taxable income.  Taxable income, the Minster argued, takes various non-economic 
adjustments into account that the tax writers designed to provide tax subsidies having 
functions unrelated to ability to pay.  Hence the child supplement rules for computing 
income approximate better true economic income and provide a better measure of need 
for the increased supplement than does taxable income.  While the Minister conceded it is 
not possible to measure economic income under any set of rules perfectly, the child 
supplement rules are as or more reasonable than the income tax computation rules.359
 The Constitutional Court accepted the Minister’s line of argument and held that 
neither the equality principle,360 the protection of family principle,361 nor the social state 
principle362 required a uniform base for measurement of income under the child 
supplement and the income tax laws.363  The legislature correctly may factor out tax 
subsidies364 and losses from activities that the individual does not enter with a profit 
making intent365 in ascertaining the family’s need for the increased child supplement.  
Disregarding true economic losses in the computation that prohibits offsetting losses 
from one income group against income in another group the court found would eliminate 
the formidable administrative task of separating economic from non-economic tax losses.  
Hence that imperfection that would fail to recognize some economic losses was also 
constitutionally permissible.366
In examining the structure of the child supplement, the court discovered that the 
supplement did not appear to be a fundamental element of the state’s guarantee to each 
citizen of subsistence consistent with human dignity.  The child supplement was 
independent of that subsistence minimum and was based on a far higher living standard 
than subsistence.367  Accordingly, the state could eliminate the child supplement if the 
legislature chose to do so.  Similarly, the family protection principle permits but does not 
require the state to provide the family with any or a specific level of child supplement.368
And the court notes that the combination of the child supplement and the tax savings 
from exemption for dependent children generally is far less than the actual cost of 
supporting a child so that exemption amounts and child supplements seem to serve a 
purpose other than subsistence and are not subject to as strict scrutiny as subsistence 
guarantees might be.369
359 Id. at 72-3.   
360 Basic Law Art 3 para. 1. 
361 Basic Law Art. 6 para. 1. 
362 Basic Law Art. 20 para 1.   
363 BVerfGE 82 at 99. 
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 100-1. 
366 Id. at 101. 
367 Id. at 79-80
368 Id. at 81-2. 
369 Id. at 95.  But compare the decision in the subsistence exemption case discussed in the following 
commencing with the text accompanying note 381 infra. 
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 In the course of its analysis of the income computation method for the child 
supplement, the court observed that taxing the subsistence minimum would diminish the 
taxpayer’s resources to meet basic needs.  That diminution, in turn, might compel the 
state to provide a direct subsidy to the taxpayer to guarantee the subsistence minimum.370
Given the choice between protecting the subsistence minimum from the income tax and 
requiring a state subsidy to increase the taxpayer’s resources to the subsistence minimum, 
the court determines that exemption of the subsistence minimum from tax is the better 
choice.  In addition, rather than taxing all income, but assuring the taxpayer a net income 
amount at least equal to the subsistence minimum, the court exempts the subsistence 
minimum amount from income taxation for all taxpayers in order to protect horizontal 
equity.  Hence, the income tax must not tax that portion of the family’s income equal to 
the subsistence minimum. 371  Any other approach would cause families with dependent 
children to be at a disadvantage relative to other families, assuming that income in excess 
of the subsistence minimum is disposable.372  An example illustrates the court’s 
reasoning: 
Compare two families having equal amounts of disposable income, two 
adult members, one with a dependent child and one without, and a tax rate 
of 50%.  Assume that the subsistence minimum for a two adult family is 
10,000 and 5000 more for a dependent child.  The first family has income 
of 30,000 and the second income of 25,000.  A tax rate of 50% on all 
income leaves the first family with disposable income of zero (30,000 x 
.50 = 15,000 tax payable in full and leaving the family with the 
subsistence minimum of 15,000 after tax) and the second family with 
disposable income of 2,500 (25,000 x .50 = 12,500 tax from 25,000 leaves 
2,500 disposable over the 10,000 subsistence minimum).  If, on the other 
hand, only disposable income is taxable, each family is left with the same 
amount of disposable income – 7,500 (15,000 disposable subject to 7,500 
tax at 50%). 
The equality principle, in conjunction with the family protection principle, requires that 
tax law treat taxpayers with dependent children the same as taxpayers without dependent 
children, as expenses of raising children are expenses that diminish the individual’s 
ability to pay tax as opposed to discretionary personal expenses that the tax law may 
disregard in assessing tax.373  Having defined ability to pay tax in terms of disposable 
370 Id. at 85.  The court in the dual household cases, BVerfGE 107, 27, supra note 314, expanded this 
minimum nontaxable amount to include essential family expenditures that diminish disposable income.  
This and the following discussion would seem unnecessary to the resolution of the case before the court 
and one would label the observations as dicta in U.S. legal analysis.   
371 Id. at 85-6 relying on the dignity principle of Basic Law Art 1, para 1, the social state principle of Basic 
Law Art 20 para 1 and the family protection principle of Basic Law Art 6 para 1.  Here the court refers to 
the income tax (and possibly other direct taxes) only, as no exemption from the turnover tax exists for low-
income families. 
372 Id. at 86. 
373 Id. at 87.  Referred to supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
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income, the court, without expressly so stating, concluded that horizontal equity demands 
equal treatment of taxpayers with like amounts of disposable income.  Vertical equity 
does not support any other approach, so that the legislature must achieve progressivity 
through increasing rates of tax on increasing amounts of disposable income.374
 Following its analysis in the child supplement case,375 the Constitutional Court 
directly addressed the adequacy of the income tax exemption amount for children in a 
decision the court released a couple of weeks later.376  Despite its holding in the earlier 
case that measurement of income for child supplement purposes could differ from 
measurement for income tax purposes, the court confirmed in this decision that a 
subsistence minimum encompassing all family members must remain free from the 
income tax.377  Adopting the methodology it applied in the child supplement case of 
converting the child supplement into an exemption equivalent and adding it to the 
exemption amount,378 the court held that the supplement and exemption combined for the 
years at issue failed to free the subsistence minimum from taxation.379  That failure 
violated the equality and family protection principles of the Basic Law.380
 The relationship between the social welfare system and the income tax and the 
adequacy of its exemptions confronted the Constitutional Court again within a short 
period. 381  Taxpayers argued that the Basic Law required an income tax exempt amount 
for all taxpayers no lower than the subsistence minimum that social welfare 
established.382  In order to determine whether the Basic Law required that level of 
exemption, the court traced the history of income tax law in Germany through its exempt 
amounts observing that “[t]he German income tax traditionally burdens only disposable 
income and frees receipts necessary to financing of basic needs … from taxation.”383
The court identified the income tax exemption as a function of the relationship that the 
income tax bears to the indirect taxes, including the value added tax, by noting that 
freeing the subsistence minimum from the income tax “compensated for the heavy 
burden that indirect taxes imposed on poorer people.”384
374 Id. at 90.   
375 BVerfGE 82, 60, discussed supra in text commencing at note 353. 
376 BVerfGE 82, 198 (June 12, 1990, 1st Senat).  The income tax exemption for children appeared in EStG 
§32 Abs 8 for the years at issue in the case.  The exemption now is at EStG §32 (6). 
377 Id. at 206-7. 
378 BVerfGE 82, 60 at 83 and following. 
379 BVerfGE 82, 198 at 208. 
380 Art. 3 para. 1 and Art 6 para. 2 respectively. 
381 BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, II Senat), supra note 123. 
382 Id. at 159. 
383 Id. at 155 (author’s translation).  The original German reads:  “Die deutsche Einkommensteuer belastet 
traditionell nur das verfügbare Einkommen und stellt die zur Finanzierung des existentiellen Bedarfs 
benötigten Einnahmen … von der Besteuerung frei.” 
384 Id. at 156 (author’s translation).  The quote suggests that the subsistence minimum increases as indirect 
taxes increase.  But while protecting the subsistence minimum as defined to encompass the cost of 
necessities including the turnover tax on the necessities, that exemption inures to the benefit of all 
taxpayers.  The exemption tends to work against vertical equity by precluding nuances of progression 
among taxpayers with materially differing sums of “disposable” income.  Compare statements in the 
legislative history to the earned income tax credit in the U.S., I.R.C. §32.  Congress intended the earned 
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 Following that historical structure, the court determined that personal freedom 
and free development of the individual’s personality,385 both freedoms that taxation tends 
to restrict, require that each taxpayer be left with an amount after income tax that is not 
less than the subsistence minimum.  At the same time, the court observed that a structure 
that exempts the subsistence minimum must not disregard the principle of vertical equity 
requiring progressivity in the income tax.386
While the subsistence minima social welfare fixes in providing subsidies to 
individuals do not necessarily constitute a perfect measure of subsistence, they provide a 
baseline below which the income tax may impose no burden.387  But as the social welfare 
system provides social assistance based upon local conditions, subsistence minima that 
social welfare administration establishes are only rough estimates of the minima.  The 
federal legislature must exempt an amount from the income tax that will protect the 
subsistence minimum in as many instances as possible.388  In any event, statistics 
demonstrate to the court that existing exemptions fail to meet subsistence minima.389
The court also rejected the notion that specific exemptions not applicable to all taxpayers 
compensate for the inadequacy of the general exemptions.390
Mindful of the burden that requiring refunds might impose on the German 
treasury, the court chose to apply its decision with respect to subsistence minima and the 
income tax prospectively.391  Social welfare assistance would be available to taxpayers 
whom the income tax might leave with insufficient resources to meet their subsistence 
needs.392  Despite prospective application, the Constitutional Court firmly established an 
income tax exemption zone around the subsistence minimum and looked to the social 
income credit to enable low-income families to meet the rising cost of living and to offset partially the 
regressive effect of the social security tax on employed low-income individuals.  HR 2166, HR Report 94-
19 at 10 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, Feb. 25, 1975) and more directly, S.Rep. 94-36 (94th Cong. 1st Sess, March 17, 
1975) at 11 that reads in part:  “[t]he credit is set at 10 percent in order to correspond roughly to the added 
burdens placed on workers by both the employee and employer social security contributions.”  The Senate 
report suggests that Senate taxwriters believed that the employee bore the burden of both the employer’s 
and the employee’s share of social security taxes.  Unlike the subsistence minimum exemption in Germany, 
the earned income credit phases out as taxpayers’ incomes increase. 
385 Id. at 169 citing Basic Law Art. 2 para. 1. 
386 Id. at 170, citing with approval BVerfGE 82, 60, 89, discussed in detail supra notes 370-374 and 
accompanying text. 
387 Id. at 170-71. 
388 Id. at 172. 
389 Id. at 174-5. 
390 Id. at 176. 
391 Id. at 178.  Note that taxpayers who, two years earlier, successfully argued that the exemptions for 
children were inadequate to meet the subsistence minimum received relief in BVerfGE 82, 198, discussed 
supra beginning with note 376. 
392 Id. at 180. 
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welfare system to define that minimum,393 including the effect of indirect taxes on the 
individual.394
In late 1998, the Constitutional Court traced a more detailed methodology for 
determining the amount of the tax-free subsistence minimum for children.395  The court 
specified that while the social welfare amount generally would continue to provide the 
floor for the minimum, certain departures from social welfare computational methods 
were permissible.  For example, with respect to incremental housing needs for an 
additional child, social welfare used a per capita computation, but the court accepted an 
incremental need standard that takes into account that no additional common area space 
(kitchens, bathrooms) is necessary when the family adds a child.396  While accepting a 
shortfall tolerance of as much as 15 percent of the subsistence minimum for a child 
between the tax exemption and social welfare amounts, that tolerance would diminish if 
the computation for tax purposes rejects social welfare’s questionable computational 
conventions such as per capita.397
The court required that the subsistence minimum remain free of income tax at all 
income levels and marginal rates of tax.398  As Germany provided a child supplement for 
each child, as well as an income tax exemption for each child, conversion of the child 
supplement into its exemption equivalence became necessary to ascertain whether the 
combination of the supplement and the exemption together left the subsistence minimum 
per child exempt from taxation.399  Conversion of the child supplement into a deduction 
equivalent must operate at each taxpayer’s maximum marginal tax rate, lest taxpayers 
with children bear a disproportional tax burden relative to taxpayers without children or 
to taxpayers in higher marginal brackets exempt from tax on the full family subsistence 
minimum.400  For the tax year in question, one child, taxpaying families with marginal 
393 Id. at 171. 
394 Supra note 384 and accompanying text.  As subsistence minima relate in part to the burden of indirect 
taxes that each individual bears, those minima must include indirect taxes and eliminate the regressivity of 
the indirect taxes through either direct welfare payments that guarantee human dignity (including payment 
of indirect taxes) or exemption from the income tax of amounts necessary to the meet the minima including 
the indirect taxes.   
395 BVerfGE 99, 246 (November 10, 1998, 2d Senat).  This decision is one of three the Constitutional Court 
issued on the same day addressing the same issue but for different taxpayers and taxable years.  The other 
cases are BVerfGE 99, 268 (November 10, 1998, 2d Senat) and BVerfGE 99, 273 (November 10, 1998, 2d 
Senat). 
396 Id. at 263. 
397 Id. 
398 Id. at 264-5. 
399 Id. at 265.  See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
400 Id.  The computational intricacy of this concept is important.  The court’s underlying fairness principle 
is that progressive rates commence for all taxpayers at the same point:  income in excess or the subsistence 
minimum for the family.  The subsistence minimum is exempt from income tax.  See the example in the 
text following note 372 supra.  Like any deduction, the subsistence minimum exemption is more valuable 
for taxpayers subject to higher maximum rates of tax than taxpayers subject to lower maximum rates, since 
deductions reduce tax at the margin.  As the Constitutional Court views the subsistence minimum as an 
exemption from tax, consistency demands that, in evaluating a direct subsidy like the child supplement as 
satisfying part of that subsistence exemption, it must convert the subsidy into its exemption equivalent 
amount.  That means that the court must take tax rates in account.  Accordingly, it requires a larger subsidy 
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rates of 40% or more do not enjoy a full subsistence exemption.401  While the 
Constitutional Court left the Federal Financial Court to fashion the appropriate form of 
remedy, the Constitutional Court was unwilling to apply its holding prospectively 
only,402 as it had done in the earlier subsistence case.403
The Constitutional Court has shown itself to tolerate legislative and administrative 
imprecision in application of the equality principle as needed to allow for generalized 
approaches to taxation.  For example, the court allowed a generalized approach to the 
deduction for home office expenditures.404  The statute on home office expenditures 
distinguished among home offices used 50 percent or less for business for which there 
was no deduction; home offices used more than 50 percent for business but that were not 
the center of the taxpayer’s business activity for which the statute limited the deduction to 
a specific amount; and home offices used exclusively as the center of the taxpayer’s 
business activity for which all expense were deductible.405  The taxpayer argued that the 
statute allowed the full cost of an outside office and placed home offices at a 
disadvantage.  The court, however, accepted the need to generalize in the law and 
permitted the statute to stand, even though it might result in some home office users 
being placed at a disadvantage.406
Nevertheless, the legislative wish to generalize and categorize may not conflict 
with the equality principle in conjunction with the protection of family principle.407
Confronted with possible disparate treatment of families relative to one another or 
families without children, recent decisions affirm both the Constitutional Court’s 
commitment to a family subsistence minimum free from income taxation and a level 
playing field for all taxpayers without regard to family status.408
for higher rate individuals to convert into the same exemption amount for lower rate individuals.  Hence a 
€1000 subsidy to a 20% bracket taxpayer is the same as a €5000 exemption, but only a €2500 exemption to 
a 40% bracket taxpayer.  So a €2000 exemption is needed for the 40% bracket taxpayer to protect the same 
subsistence minimum of €5000.  If that outcome seems rather peculiar since a direct subsidy covers the 
same amount of expenses for each family, it is nevertheless inherent in defining the subsistence minimum 
as an exemption rather than providing a refundable credit against tax to all taxpayers in an amount equal to 
the subsistence minimum.  To a limited extent Germany does just that by providing welfare assistance to 
individuals whose incomes are less than the subsistence minimum.  See the Bundessozialhilfegesetz 
(Federal Social Welfare Law) (June 30, 1961, version of March 23, 1994, as amended through November 
25, 2003). 
401Id. at 266.   
402 Id. at 267-8.   
403 Supra note 391 and accompanying text. 
404 BVerfGE 101, 297 (July 12, 1999, 2d Senat). 
405 EStG §4 (5) 6b.  Compare the U.S. restrictions on home office deductions in IRC § 280A. 
406 BVerfGE 101, supra note 404, at 310. 
407 Basic Law Art. 6. 
408 BVerfGE 102, 127 (May 24, 2000, 1st Senat), BVerfGE , , 2 BvR 167/02 (January 11, 2005, 2d Senat) 
(available at:  http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20050111_2bvr016702.html), BVerfGE , , 2 BvL 
7/00 (March 16, 2005) (available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20050316_2bvl000700.html), 
cases discussed in text following this note. 
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In the first of these cases,409 the taxpayer could not claim the child exemption and 
did not receive the child supplement for her adult child because the child, who otherwise 
met the requirements for a continuing exemption and supplement, earned income in 
excess of the statutory limit.  Under a statutory “cliff” loss of benefits provision in both 
the income tax law and the social security law, as soon as a child’s income exceeded a 
fixed sum, the benefits were lost.  The taxpayer argued both that the loss of benefits 
provision was unfair because it did not provide for any phased structure and that the 
computational structure in the case of her child was unfair.  The court reached the second 
but not the first argument in finding for the taxpayer.  Unlike customary employment 
relationships in Germany that require the employer to reduce the employee’s 
compensation by the employee’s share of social insurance payments, that withholding-
type rule did not apply to the child’s employment relationship.  Accordingly, the child’s 
employer did not withhold.  Specifically, the child’s employer was not required to reduce 
the child’s income by the amount of social security contributions, as permitted for the 
specific employment relationship.  Even though the child had to make the payments in 
any event, the child’s income was measured for loss of benefits on a pre-social insurance 
contribution basis.  Other employment relationships deducted social insurance payments 
from income first, so that other children with comparable gross incomes measured their 
incomes for loss of benefit purposes on an after social insurance payments basis.  
Accordingly, the income measurement affected the taxpayer’s child adversely relative to 
similarly situated individuals with comparable incomes.  The Constitutional Court held 
that the equality principle required consistent measurement of income for all taxpayers, 
so that the taxpayer’s child, so viewed, received income that was less than the loss of 
benefits amount.  The court noted that it need not answer the other argument in this case 
because the income measurement issued controlled the outcome for the taxpayer. 
In the second of the two decisions,410 the Constitutional Court turned its attention 
to childcare expenditures that are deductible as costs of income production.411  The 
income tax provision allowing the childcare deduction placed both a floor and a ceiling 
on the deductible amount.  Although the taxpayer did not challenge the ceiling, the court 
commented that the ceiling seemed a reasonable accommodation to control excessive 
expenditures that were in fact discretionary, rather than necessary, to facilitate parental 
employment or training.  The floor during the year at issue was an imputed sum based 
upon the taxpayer’s filing status and income.412  Only expenditures in excess of that 
imputed amount were deductible.  The court observed that the statute placed parents with 
childcare expenses at a disadvantage relative to individuals with no children.  Since 
childcare expenditures were not discretionary but mandatory for working parents, the 
floor rendered some portion of childcare expenses non-deductible.  The floor resulted in 
income taxation of non-disposable income, and diminution of the income tax free family 
subsistence minimum in violation of equality principle combined with the protection of 
409 BVerfGE , , 2 BvR 167/02. 
410 BVerfGE , , 2 BvL 7/00, supra note 408 (March 16, 2005). 
411 EStG § 33c (allowing the deduction for parents who are working or attending school or training).  
Compare the limited tax credit under U.S. law, I.R.C. §21. 
412 Under the current statute, the floor is a fixed sum per child. 
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family principle.413  The court emphasized that the principle of horizontal equity in 
taxation, especially as it might affect decisions whether or not to have children, was 
particularly robust.414
B. Marriage Penalties.  Relatively early in the post-war period, the Constitutional 
Court addressed a challenge to the mandatory joint assessment of married individuals 
under the income tax.415  Rate brackets in effect for 1951, the tax year at issue in the case, 
applicable to jointly assessed couples were somewhat broader at lower incomes than 
individual brackets, but not twice individual brackets.416  The rate structure did benefit 
some couples.  If the couple had a principal income earning spouse and the other spouse 
earned a small amount of income or no income, joint assessment was beneficial to the 
couple as the joint brackets would free a larger amount of income from tax than would 
separate filing at individual rates.417  Where both spouses earned substantial income or 
comparable amounts of income, separate assessment at individual rates would result in a 
smaller tax burden for the marital unit than would joint assessment.418
While the statute nominally required joint assessment for all spouses who lived 
together for four months or more during the assessment period,419 the implementing 
regulation excluded from the joint assessment base, income that the wife earned from 
employment (rather than self-employment) so long as the husband was not her 
employer.420  The regulation places the sub-classification of self-employed, married 
women at a disadvantage relative to employed married women as well as both employed 
and self-employed married men.  The Constitutional Court easily could have decided the 
413 Compare the discussion of the two residence household, supra in text accompanying and following note 
331. 
414 2 BvL 7/00, supra note 408, at ¶45-6. 
415 BVerfGE 6, 55 (January 17, 1957). 
416 Under section 32 of the income tax law of 1951 (Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 in the version from 
January 17, 1952), married couples were in tax class II, individuals with children in class III and other 
taxpayers in class I.  Additional exempt amounts applied to classes II and III and the tax tables imposed a 
smaller tax on the incomes of taxpayers of up to 5000 German Marks who were in classes II and III than 
the tables imposed on class I taxpayers.  Moreover, one spouse’s losses offset the other spouse’s income.  
Under current law, the brackets are effectively twice the individual brackets.  EStG §32a (5) assesses a 
spouse on half the marital unit’s income at individual rates and doubles the amount of tax computed in that 
manner.  U.S. law with its separate rate schedules for individual and married taxpayers continues to 
resemble the earlier German model, the joint filing brackets are broader than unmarried individual bracket 
but not twice as broad, and married filing separately brackets are half the breadth of the joint brackets.  IRC 
§1(a), (c), (d).  Note, however, that IRC §1(f)(8) makes the joint filing brackets equal to twice the single 
individual brackets for the 15% bracket for the 2003 and 2004 tax years and again for 2008 through 2010 
with smaller sizes for the intermediate years. 
417 For example, a single earner family with income of 5000 German Marks drew a tax 652 Marks in Class 
II while a Class I taxpayer would have paid 810 Marks.  Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 Table B. 
418 If married taxpayers each had income of 2500 Marks (total 5000), each would pay 235 Marks for a total 
tax of 470 Marks if they were separate Class I taxpayers, but 652 Marks on the combined income as Class 
II taxpayers.  Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 Table B. 
419 Id. at 56.  Einkommensteuergesetz 1951 §26.  
420 Section 43 of the implementing regulation to the income tax law (Einkommensteuer-
Durchführungsverordnung in the version of January 17, 1952) §43.
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case on narrow equality principle grounds as discriminatory against the sub-class.  
Instead the court chose not to address that discrimination as its decisional basis.421
After disposing of the procedural limitation that pre-constitutional law might 
impose on the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction,422 the court traced the rather interesting 
history of the rather peculiar selection of self-employed, married women for mandatory 
joint assessment on their earnings.423  Early tax laws in Prussia assessed family income as 
a unit and later freed certain household members from common assessment.  Legislation 
from 1921 separated the wife’s income from services from her income from other sources 
and permitted separate assessment of that service income.  During the period that the 
National Socialist controlled the German government, the government included the 
wife’s income from services again in the joint assessment.  According to the secretary of 
finance at that time, the goal of the inclusion was for the political purpose of forcing 
women out of the labor market.  The subsequent exception for income from services as 
an employee became necessary, as the war demanded that women return to the work 
force to support the war effort.424
The Constitutional Court examined the protection of marriage principle that the 
Basic Law includes425 and rejected mandatory joint assessment in so far as it burdened 
rather than benefited marriage.426  Arguments in favor of joint assessment were that the 
mandatory joint assessment was permissible to educate spouses and to shape the marital 
relationship in the best interests of the family and the state.  The court firmly rejected 
both arguments on protection of marriage and sexual equality grounds.427  Interpretation 
of the protection of marriage principle must be consistent with other constitutional 
protections.428  Equal rights means that the spouses always must remain free to select the 
structure of the relationship without any economic pressure from the state, in the form of 
an increased tax burden, to choose one earner rather than two earner household status.  
Thus, the Constitutional Court left no opening for modification of the joint assessment 
that would impose a greater tax burden on a married couple than on two unmarried 
individuals.429
421 BVerfGE 6 at 83 raising the Basic Law Art. 3 issues within the group of married individuals but not 
relying on them for the decision. 
422 Id. at 64. 
423 Id. at 67. 
424 Id. at 65-66.  Perhaps the recitation of the history and its link to the national socialists compelled the 
court to conclude that the joint assessment was unconstitutional, as one cannot imagine that the court would 
subscribe to a rationale emanating from the politics of that regime. 
425 Art 6, para. 1. 
426 Such an increased tax burden on the spouses that attaches to the conclusion of marriage … is 
inconsistent with Art. 6, para. 1 of the Basic Law.  BVerfGE 6 at 70.  (Author’s translation). 
427 Id. at 82 relying on Art. 3, para. 2 in addition to Art. 6. 
428 Id.
429 Spouses may elect joint or separate assessment under current law.  EStG §26 (1).  As the tax is measured 
as if each spouse received half the income, joint assessment is advantageous for single earner marital units 
and two earner units in which one spouse, if assessed separately, would not pay tax at the margin at the 
maximum rate.  For other units, joint assessment produces the same tax liability as separate assessment 
would.   
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Similarly, the Constitutional Court ruled that the disallowance of a deduction for 
salary paid to one’s spouse in computing one’s liability for the municipal business tax430
was unconstitutional431 as it likewise violated both the equality principle432 and the 
protection of marriage provision.433  Although the income tax permitted a deduction for 
salary paid to one’s spouse, the municipal business tax at issue in the case denied the 
deduction.  The legislative reasoning for denying the deduction was to protect the tax 
base.  As business owners could not deduct payments to themselves because such 
payments would undercut the tax base, they should not be able to undercut the base by 
hiring their spouses – a seemingly transparent way to avoid the deduction limit for the 
salary of the business proprietor.  Despite this rationale, the Constitutional Court saw the 
disallowance as favoring non-spousal employees over spousal employees in violation of 
equality principles and as a tax burden on marriage.  The limitation on deductibility 
would not arise if the individuals lived together but did not marry.  
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision prohibiting mandatory joint 
assessment of married couples,434 the German legislature revised the income tax law to 
permit, but not require, married taxpayers to elect joint assessment.435  Married couples 
who elect joint assessment combine their incomes, determine the tax for an individual on 
one-half that combined income and double the amount of tax.436  While joint assessment 
and income splitting is beneficial to taxpayers for whom it moderates tax progression, 
joint assessment will never result in a greater tax than the combined tax the couple would 
pay on their separately assessed incomes.437
Elective joint assessment for married couples was not without controversy.  
Single taxpayers with dependent children argued that they too should enjoy the tax 
benefit of income splitting because of the cost of caring for children.438  While 
acknowledging that a married couple without children enjoyed a more favorable tax 
position through income splitting than unmarried individuals with dependent children, the 
Constitutional Court was unwilling to find fault with income splitting.439  Instead, the 
Constitutional Court determined that splitting was not a tax subsidy but rather enabled 
couples to structure their economic arrangements within the marriage without concern for 
the tax impact of the choice.440  Essentially, splitting assigns value to one spouse’s work 
at home caring for the household and children equal to that of the other spouse’s work for 
430 Gewerbesteuer probably translates better as a business enterprise tax but as municipal governments 
impose the tax, common translation is as above. 
431 BVerfGE 13, 290 (Jan. 24, 1961). 
432 Art 3 of the Basic Law. 
433 Art 6. 
434 BVerfGE 6, 55, supra note 415.  See discussion in text accompany and following the cited note. 
435 EStG §26.  In the absence of an election, joint assessment is presumptive under EStG §26(3).  
436 The German tax law refers to the method as income splitting.  EStG §32a (5).   
437 BVerfGE 108, 351, 355 (1st Senat, Oct. 7, 2003). 
438 BVerfGE 61, 319 (March 11, 1982)   
439 Id. at 351. 
440 Id. at 345-6. 
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compensation,441 consistent with the equal rights442 and marriage protection provisions of 
the Basic Law.443  As to the single parent issue, the court acknowledged the validity of 
the claim on other grounds and viewed the issue in the similar light to its subsistence 
minima decisions.444  Holding that the deductions and exemptions available to single 
individuals with dependent children were inadequate to free the basic costs of caring for 
children from taxation,445  the court directed the legislature to eliminate the problem but 
left to the legislature the task of formulating the necessary remedy.446
More recently, the Constitutional Court reviewed the interplay of income splitting 
and maintenance obligations to a former spouse following divorce.447  The amount of 
maintenance payable to a former spouse who cannot support herself448 is a function of 
the marital standard of living that preceded the divorce (taking in account likely changes 
that already had affected the marital standard before the divorce).449  In turn, standard of 
living is a function of available resources and takes taxes payable into account.  To the 
extent that the couple elected and derived a benefit from joint assessment and income 
splitting before divorce,450 the divorce terminates availability of the election.  After 
divorce, a limited form of actual income splitting becomes available.  A former spouse 
paying maintenance may deduct some or all of the maintenance payments so long as the 
recipient consents to including the maintenance payment in her income.451  Loss of the 
more general income splitting election may increase the payer’s income tax and diminish 
resources available to him with which to pay maintenance.  The divorce court must take 
that diminution of resources into account in fixing the maintenance obligation. 
441 Id. at 346.  And see Tipke/Lang, supra note 51, at 122.  Note, however, that the court does not address 
the imputed, but untaxed income, that the spouse working at home generates.  Neither Germany nor the 
U.S. taxes imputed income from labor for one’s immediate family and does not even take cost savings from 
avoiding the cost of payment to a third party for housework into account.  See, generally, Nancy C.Staudt, 
Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that failure to tax housework forces many women 
into the labor market to find a value and appropriate compensation for their labor). 
442 Basic Law Art. 3 para. 1 
443 Basic Law Art. 6 para. 1. 
444 Discussed supra in Part IV.A. 
445 BVerfGE 61, supra note 438, at 353-4. 
446 BVerfGE 61, supra note 438, at 354. 
447 BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437. 
448 Statistically far more women in Germany and the U.S. receive maintenance or alimony than men, hence 
the selection of a feminine pronoun for the recipient of maintenance.  
449 BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437, at 353 citing the Civil Code (das Bundesgesetzbuch) § 1578 para. 1, 
sentence 1. 
450 EStG §§26, 32a (5). 
451 EStG §10 (1) 1.  Under current law, the payer’s deduction may not exceed €13,805 per annum.  EStG 
§22 1a includes the maintenance payment in the recipient’s income only to the extent of the payer’s 
deduction.  According to the Constitutional Court, the payer must indemnify the recipient who consents to 
the inclusion in her income from the tax cost of the inclusion.  BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437 at 356.  
The indemnification is not a statutory requirement but the result a fair exchange of consent for the 
indemnity as confirmed in case law.  See PALANDT BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Civil Code) 1489 
(Munich 1999).  U.S. law provides similarly for actual income splitting through alimony (without a ceiling 
on the deduction and inclusion) under I.R.C. §§71, 215.  The payer’s deduction is an adjustment to gross 
income under I.R.C. §62(a)(10), and not an itemized deduction under I.R.C. §63, so that the deduction 
provides a tax benefit to the payer even if the payer does not itemize his deductions. 
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When the individual who is obligated to pay maintenance remarries, the new 
marriage entitles the spouses to elect joint assessment and income splitting.452  Income 
splitting in the new marriage may decrease the maintenance paying individual’s tax 
burden and increase his economic resources accordingly.453  In the combined cases 
before the Constitutional Court,454 divorced spouses receiving maintenance payments in 
such remarriage situations successfully claimed in the lower courts that the protection of 
marriage principle entitled them to share in the increased resources that the new income 
splitting election generated.455  The Constitutional Court ruled, however, that the income 
splitting opportunity belonged to the new marriage, so that, that protection of marriage 
principle required that any increased resources remain with the new marriage.456
C. Assessment, Collection and the Equality Principle.  Perhaps the most radically, 
far-reaching of the Constitutional Court’s tax decisions is its recent securities speculation 
case.457  In that decision the court held that the equality principle458 precluded assessment 
and collection of the tax on speculation profits from trading in securities because most 
taxpayers easily evade that tax.  Thus, the structural deficiency in execution of the tax 
law459 rendered the application of the tax law to honest taxpayers unfair.460
 Unlike the possible constitutional barrier to taxing unrealized gains in the United 
States,461 there is no constitutional barrier to taxation of capital gain in Germany.462
However, Germany did not (and does not) treat individuals’ capital gains as income,463
except the gains from speculation in securities having a holding period in the taxpayer’s 
hands of not more than six months.464  The statute sought to tax those gains that might 
result from the conduct of trading activity, rather than simple capital appreciation while 
452 EStG §§26, 32a (5). 
453 In the instances before the Constitutional Court, the increase in resources was a function of the 
applicable tax table to use for the wage tax (Lohnsteuer), a tax collection method that is similar to wage 
withholding in the U.S.  I.R.C. §3401 et. seq. 
454 BVerfGE 108, 351, supra note 437. 
455 Id. at 352, one case comes from the state appellate court in Brunswick (Oberlandesgericht 
Braunschweig) and the other from the state appellate court in Stuttgart (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart). 
456 Id. at 369. 
457 BVerfGE 110, 94 (March 9, 2004, 2d Senate), supra note 30. 
458 Basic Law 3(1). 
459 In German:  ein strukturelles Vollzugsdefizit (author’s translation). 
460Compare the U.S. exemption of the capital gains of non-resident aliens and foreign entities not engaged 
in a U.S. trade or business.  I.R.C. §§871(a) and 881(a) do not include capital gain in the income that is 
subject to withholding.  Congress exempted capital gains because it was impractical to collect tax on the 
gain.  See Rohmer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 862 (1946) 
(permitting taxation of royalties under the predecessor to I.R.C. §871 and discussing legislative history of 
inability to tax capital gains).   
461 Eisner v. Macomber, supra note 12, discussed in note 169 and accompanying text. 
462 BVerfGE 26, 302, 312 (July 9, 1969, 2d Sen.). 
463 See, supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
464 BVerfGE 110, 94, 95-6 quoting in part §23 of the Income Tax Law as in effect in 1998 referring to 
speculation activities.  Under current law, the provision refers to private sale activities and encompasses 
securities the taxpayer has held for no more than one year.  EStG §23(1) 2.  Compare short term capital 
gain under I.R.C. §1222(1).   
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enjoying a possible income benefit from the investment through dividend or interest 
income.465
 The statute, however, did not provide for a withholding tax on those gains466 or 
informational reporting by third party intermediaries.467  The taxing agency lacked 
authority to go on a fishing expedition468 into private and third party records, and privacy 
rights prevented banking and other third parties from providing information on 
transactions to the taxing authorities in the absence of an express and specific reporting 
obligation.  Moreover, during the years at issue, the tax authorities made no meaningful 
effort to identify short term trading profits from securities through regular audit activities.  
Hence there was little threat of detection to encourage taxpayers to report honestly.469
While the statute imposed a reporting obligation on taxpayers, the Constitutional Court 
observed that the tax would act as a penalty for honest taxpayers who reported their 
activities but generally would fail to reach taxpayers who failed to report.470  In effect but 
not in form, the statute imposed a greater tax burden on honest taxpayers than it did on 
dishonest taxpayers and so violated the equality principle.471
 The Constitutional Court expressly limited its decision to the trading of securities 
in the taxable years 1997 and 1998.472  As the essence of the decision is lack of and 
barriers to enforcement rendering assessment and collection from honest taxpayers a 
violation of horizontal equity principles, the decision might extend to other activities, 
including independent personal services.  The court seeks to anticipate and prevent those 
arguments by identifying differences in assessment and collection for other activities.  
For short term dealing in real estate that the same statute governs,473 as opposed to 
holding real estate for income production or personal use, the court noted that 
information reporting prevented the level of tax evasion present with respect to securities 
465 Id. at 98.  The Constitutional Court cites decisions of the Federal Financial Court to explain that the 
statute in question, EStG §23, in the case of land speculation, sought to distinguish those taxpayers who 
held land in order to derive income from operation or farming of the land from those taxpayers who 
primarily speculated in the value of the land itself by buying and selling land over relatively short holding 
periods. 
466 EStG §38 (employer withholding of wage tax); §43, 44 (entity withholding on dividends, creditor 
withholding on interest).  
467 Germany lacks the extensive array of information reporting that Ch. 61, Subch. A, Part III, I.R.C. §6031 
et seq., requires of U.S. persons.  See discussion in Roman Seer, Besteuerungsverfahren, supra note 60 at 
62-63 and 128 (Tabelle 15, Kontollmitteilungspflichten). 
468 Colloquial (author’s translation of the equally colloquial ‘ins Blaue hinein’ that the court uses at 
BVerfGE 110, 94, 115. 
469 Id. at 114-15.   
470 Id. at 104.  Compare BVerfGE 84, 239 (June 27, 1991) (holding for similar reasons that taxation of 
interest income was unconstitutional but delaying application of the decision to give the tax authorities time 
to equalize collection of the tax). 
471 As the court relies on the indirect evidence from market conditions yielding considerable profits without 
offsetting losses during the years at issue to support its conclusion of unequal tax burdens, the court 
reserves judgment as to any unconstitutional impact of enforcement of the statute in years after 1998 when 
market losses may have offset the market gains.  Id. at 140-1.  
472 Id. at 111. 
473 EStG §23(1). 
© Copyright 2005 Henry Ordower 
Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation - Germany/U.S. Constitutional Principles 
 Page 51 
trading.474  Transfers of land require participation of a notary,475 has a reporting 
obligation for tax on real property acquisition.476  With respect to leasing activities, the 
income from which taxpayers might not report, the court notes that taxpayers generally 
hold the property for extensive periods and have an incentive to report income because 
they will wish to deduct their losses from the activity.477
In other areas where Germany has a serious problem with the underreporting of 
income, the court finds that the taxing authority’s collection efforts differ materially from 
those for short term securities trading.  For example, the Constitutional Court anticipates 
and dismisses the possible argument of taxpayers, who are not employees and, therefore, 
not subject to the withholding mechanisms of the wage tax.  Those taxpayers might argue 
that the underreporting problem in the underground economy478 causes the taxation of the 
income from the services of honest taxpayers who do report unfair because their tax 
burden exceeds that of dishonest taxpayers who the tax system cannot identify and 
control.479  Thus they might argue that taxation of independent service income then 
similarly would violate the equality principle, that is, “the constitutional requirement of 
actual identical taxation burden through identical law enforcement”480 would be lacking.  
To that argument, the Constitutional Court observes that unconditional tax audits for such 
income, as contrasted with the dearth of audit activity for short term securities trading, 
pose more that an incidental risk of discovery for the underreporting taxpayer.  Thus, 
unlike securities trading, the assessment system does not invite under- or non-reporting of 
income from services.481  Similarly, the taxing authorities programmatically and actively 
seek to discover offshore investment in order to tax income from that capital.482
D. Retroactivity.  An early series of three decisions established the principle that a 
rate increase during a tax year may apply to the whole year483 but that a rate increase may 
474 BVerfGE 110, 94 at 132. 
475 Civil law legal systems assign a major role to notaries who prepare transfer documents and handle many 
of the tasks that attorneys carry out in the United States.  
476 Grunderwebsteuergesetz §18. 
477 BVerfGE 110, 94 at 132. 
478 Schattenwirtschaft (shadow economy). 
479479 Like the U.S., Germany has a substantial segment of its economy that escapes taxation because 
service providers receive payments in cash that the service recipient does not report.  The German term for 
such work is Schwarzarbeit (black work or black market work) and was estimated to represent some 16 
pecent of Germany’s gross domestic product in 2001, increasing gradually from 12% in 1990.  Annette 
Mummert and Friedrich Schneider, 58 FinanzArchiv 286 (2001), estimated to be 643 billion German 
Marks in 2001 (€ 329 billion).  Id.  Note, however, that insofar as the unreported income in Germany 
involves low wage workers, as it does in the U.S., those workers would not pay income tax in any event 
because of the subsistence minimum that is exempt from income tax.  The unreported income becomes 
subject to the turnover tax just as fully reported income does when the workers consume goods and 
services, so there is no loss of revenue that the government otherwise would collect.  See discussion of the 
relationship between the turnover tax and the subsistence minimum exemption supra in Part 2.  Hence the 
revenue loss with such work primarily is a function of taxes and mandatory contributions for social welfare. 
480 Translating BVerfGE 110, 94 at 112:  “das verfassungsrechtliche Gebot tatsächlich gleicher 
Steuerbelastung durch gleichen Gesetzesvollzug ….” 
481 BVerfGE 110, 94 at 133. 
482 Id. at 133-34. 
483 BVerfGE 13, 274 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate). 
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not apply to a closed year484 unless taxpayers reasonably anticipate that an unset rate 
must become fixed.485  The outcome of the first cited case matches the result in the 
United States.486  But the strict limitation that the second case imposes to limit 
retroactivity to the current year does not apply in the United States when the change is a 
rate or base change, rather than the imposition of a new tax.487  The German cases rely on 
the rule of law principle emanating from the constitutional definition of Germany as “a 
democratic and social federal state.”488  The principle requires that citizens have the 
opportunity to know what the law is so that they may conform their behavior and modify 
their transactions to use the law most effectively. 
E. Value Dependent Taxes and the Equality Principle.  The Constitutional Court held 
both wealth tax489 and the inheritance tax490 to be inconsistent with the equality 
principle.491  Both the wealth tax law and the inheritance tax law used the valuation 
standards and methods that the valuation law provided.492  Other than rental real property 
and real property used as part of a business for which capitalization of earnings provided 
the value, fixed values applied to real property under the valuation law.  The fixed values 
were 1964 assessment values multiplied by 1.4.  Since securities were valued at market 
and productive property at capitalization of earnings or, in the case of property not in 
production, but productive, capitalization of estimated earnings as productive, the values 
of those properties were reasonably up to date.  Real property, on the other hand, tended 
to be undervalued substantially, as the overall real estate market had advanced 
considerably since 1964.  Applying the same rate of tax to real estate as to other property 
meant that taxpayers whose wealth or inheritance concentrated itself in real estate paid 
disproportionately lower taxes than taxpayers who owned or received other property.  
That disparity violated the equality principle and rendered both statutes 
unconstitutional.493
484 BVerfGE 13, 261 (Dec. 19, 1961, 2d Senate). 
485 BVerfGE 13, 279 (December 19, 1961, 2d Senate). however in this case the rate was set nine months 
into the year, so that the earlier cases might have sufficed to decide this case as well. 
486 Darusmont v. United States, supra note 153. 
487 Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F2d 514 (CA2, 1942), cert. denied 317 US 655 (1942).  
Debate concerning this issue of retroactivity continues in the US.  See articles cited supra note 153.  
Congress often announces effective dates in advance of enactment so that taxpayers are on notice of 
pending, retroactive changes. 
488 Art 20 of the Basic Law generates the Rechtstaatprinzip. 
489 BVerfGE 93, 121, supra note 28, (June 22, 1995).  The Wealth Tax Law of 1974 
(Vermögensteuergesetz), (in the version of November 14, 1990, most recently amended by the law of 
September 14, 1994) applied to the case.  
490 BVerfGE 93, 165, supra note 28, (June 22, 1995).  The Inheritance and Gift Tax Law of 1934 
(Erbschaftsteuer- und Schenkungsteuergesetz), (in the version of February 19, 1991, last amended 
September 27, 1994) (current version available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/erbstg_1974/index.html)applied to the case. 
491 Basic Law Art. 3(1).  Compare, supra note 234 and accompanying text, discussion of Allegheny 
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission Of Webster County, West Virginia, 488 U.S. 336,. 
492 Valuation Law (Bewertungsgesetz), version of February 1, 1991 (current version available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/bewg/index.html). 
493 BVerfGE 93 at 144 and at 176.  The wealth tax has not been in effect since January 1, 1997.  The 
inheritance tax continues to apply and the parliament amended the valuation law to use more realistic 
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 With respect to the wealth tax, the Constitutional Court expressed concern about 
the level of all taxes on production and stated the principle of halves to prevent taxes 
from confiscating the property itself, half of the production for private use and half to 
public use.494  Further, in order to equalize the burden between productive and 
unproductive property, the court stated that all values for productive property must use an 
estimated, rather than an actual production, for capitalization in order to provide a level 
field of valuation.495  The court did not express the same confiscation concern about the 
inheritance tax although it did observe that the inheritance tax should not be so high as to 
jeopardize continuation of a going concern by diminishing its resources.496
F. Turnover Tax and the Equality Principle.  Where medical unions that provided 
laboratory services to practitioners were exempt from the turnover tax, but independent 
laboratories were not, the Constitutional Court held that the preference violated the 
equality principle.497  The court was concerned that the turnover tax exemption provided 
a tax advantage that interfered with free competition.  Similarly, the Constitutional Court 
held that the equality principle prohibits imposition of a higher turnover tax rate for 
medical practitioners operating through entities than on sole practitioners.498  These cases 
are concerned with competition between or among individuals and entities operating in 
the same economic activity, rather than the impact of the tax upon the consumer who 
bears the burden of the tax.   
In other cases, the Constitutional Court has proven far less receptive to claims of 
unequal treatment of taxpayers under the turnover tax than under other taxes.  The court 
held that a significantly lower turnover tax rate for small businesses with gross receipts 
under 60,000 German marks than for other enterprises was a reasonable exercise of 
legislative discretion and did not violate the equality principle.  With the significant 
general rate increase, the legislature carved out the exception because it was concerned 
that the small businesses would not be able to pass the higher rate on to their 
customers.499  In a case addressing the credit for the pre-tax on imported milk powder, 
failure to adjust the computation for the specific industry, rather than using a generalized 
computation, did not violate the equality principle.  Some inequalities were unavoidable 
to efficient tax administration.500  And imposition of the full rate of turnover tax on 
musical recordings, while reductions in rate or exemptions from the turnover tax existed 
for many other cultural endeavors, including books, theater productions, and concerts, did 
not violate the equality principle.501  The court held that the legislature analyzed and 
multipliers for real property in order to approximate current fair market values.  Valuation Law Supp. 
(BewG Anlagen) 6-8 in the version last amended December 20, 2001. 
494 Id. at 138, supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
495 Id. at 137. 
496 Id. at 176. 
497 BVerfGE 43, 58 (October 26, 1976, 1st Senat). 
498 BVerfGE 101, 151 (November 10, 1999, 2nd Senat). 
499 BVerfGE 37, 38 (March 19, 1974, 1st Senat). 
500 BVerfGE 31, 145, 179 (June 9, 1971, 2d Senat). 
501 BVerfGE 36, 321 (March 5, 1974, 1st Senat). 
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grouped cultural activities, in part, on the basis of which activities would need a tax 
diminution in order to retain their profitability, a political decision properly within the 
expertise of the legislature.  Records enjoyed a strong market position.502  No case raised 
the question of the regressive impact of the turnover tax on consumers. 
Part 5. Conclusion.  Relative to the limited impact of U.S. Supreme Court constitutional 
jurisprudence on taxation, the German body of constitutional law based taxation 
decisions is vast.  While the United States Supreme Court confirms the power of the 
legislature to classify taxpayers, so long as those classifications have a rational basis, the 
German Constitutional Court’s decisions reflect near hypersensitivity to classifications of 
taxpayers that may limit those taxpayer’s individual rights in any manner or cause some 
taxpayers to receive less favorable tax treatment than others.  Explanatory hypotheses for 
these differences include: 
1. That the constitutions differ, such that German constitutional protections are more 
robust than comparable U.S. protections, whether that robustness is intrinsic or a function 
of the existence of a specialized constitutional court.   
2. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the German Constitutional Court has no simple 
method like denial of certiorari to enable it to refuse to hear significant constitutional 
questions.  Moreover, the German court’s tunnel vision compels it to resolve 
constitutional questions rather than resorting to statutory grounds for a finding, so that it 
defers less to the legislature than does the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Constitution Court 
may view its role as a mandate to ferret out constitutional infirmity and resolve it against 
the administration and legislature. 
3. That, alternatively, United States constitutional protections are more durable; the 
Court reverses its precedents only rarely.  The Supreme Court is very careful and 
conservative in offering constitutional protection. 
4. The Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction and prefers to decide cases 
on grounds other than the Constitution rather than addressing the constitutional issue.503
The strong United States tradition of separation of powers causes the Court to avoid, 
whenever possible, conflict with the legislature and to leave most policy matters to the 
legislature under the Court’s policy of judicial restraint.  
5. That the differences reflect maturation.  Earlier in U.S. constitutional history, the 
Supreme Court more readily struck down tax provisions but with time, it became more 
respectful of legislative choices.  Perhaps the same development will occur in Germany 
as the Constitutional Court matures. 
502 Id. at 340-1. 
503 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring but 
stating the principle that courts should dispose of cases without deciding constitutional issues whenever 
possible). 
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Support exists for each of these hypotheses.   
Germany’s history suggests that the first hypothesis is valid.  It explains the 
emphasis on individual rights and the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to permit any 
limitations of those rights.  Emerging from the barbarism of its World War II period, 
during which the National Socialist German government mandated violation of human 
rights on an unprecedented scale, occupied West Germany adopted its Basic Law and 
established a court to protect rights under that Basic Law.504  The Basic Law confirmed 
Germany’s present and future commitment to protection of human dignity, rule of law 
and absolute prohibition of discrimination.  The Basic Law guarantees showed a 
Germany committed to distancing itself from its repressive and genocidal past and 
facilitated Germany’s reentry into a civilized and peaceful Europe as an equal 
participant.505  West Germany positioned the individual rights guarantees in the Basic 
Law in order to give them paramount importance.  Unlike the U.S. Constitution that 
emphasized the structure of the government and added individual rights as an 
afterthought in the Bill of Rights, protection of individual rights appears at the beginning 
of the Basic Law.506  Furthermore, the delineation of basic rights is specific with express 
protections of marriage, family, prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sex, and, 
the first article directing all state power to protect human dignity.  And, unlike most other 
provisions of the Basic Law, Germany prohibits emendation of the individual rights 
guarantees.507  While the same protections, other than sex discrimination, exist under the 
U.S. Constitution, many of them have emerged through constitutional interpretation.508
As to the second hypothesis, the Basic Law limits the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction to constitutional questions.509  Thus, if the court addresses a tax question at 
all, it must view the tax controversies in constitutional law terms.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court, on the other hand, easily may avoid constitutional questions by determining that a 
taxing statute is inapplicable to a specific factual situation on technical grounds.  The 
Supreme Court controls statutory interpretation.  Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
does not have the same autonomy as the Supreme Court with respect to its docket.  
Review by the Supreme Court generally lies within the Court’s discretion.510  The Basic 
504 See, generally, H.W. Koch, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GERMANY at 342-3 (London 1984). 
505 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Agreed Anglo-American Translation) (1949).  The 
states of West Germany adopted the Basic Law in May 1949 with the Preamble reading in part:  
“Conscious of its responsibility before God and mankind, filled with the resolve to preserve its national and 
political unity and to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, …”  The Preamble also 
intends the Basic Law to apply to those Germans who could not participate in the process, i.e., the German 
Democratic Republic.  Parliament amended the Preamble to include the former GDR states and to 
emphasize Germany as part of a united Europe following reunification in 1990. 
506 Basic Law Art. 1 – 20. 
507 Basic Law Art. 79 (3).  
508 For example, Basic Law Art. 11 expressly guarantees the right to travel, a right established by 
interpretation, inter alia, of the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  “The right to travel is a part of the 
"liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.”  
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) 
509 Basic Law Art. 93.  The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is slightly broader but in no way pertinent to 
tax law. 
510 Supreme Court Rule 10, supra note 8. 
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Law requires lower courts to refer constitutional issues to the Constitutional Court and 
suspend their proceedings until the Constitutional Court rules whenever a Basic Law 
interpretation is critical to resolution of a case.511  Lacking the luxury of non-
constitutional interpretation, the German Constitutional Court either must decide the 
constitutional question that caused referral or determine that, contrary to the other court’s 
analysis, the constitutional question is not critical to the case.  If the Constitutional Court 
decides that the constitutional issue is not critical to the case, it must remand the case to 
the referring court even if it differs from the lower court on a substantive, but non-
constitutional, issue in the case.  Given that choice, the Constitutional Court may choose 
to exercise jurisdiction in instances in which a U.S. Supreme Court would have avoided 
the constitutional question.512  Perhaps the Constitutional Court, whether or not 
consciously, protects its own relevance by deciding issues on constitutional grounds that 
another court might have resolved on non-constitutional grounds. 
Moreover, the Basic Law denies other courts the power to avoid constitutional 
issues – if a constitutional issue is significant to the case, referral of the constitutional 
issue to the Constitutional Court is mandatory.513  Lest courts risk being viewed as 
insensitive to individual rights, they, especially early in the post-war period, may have 
opted to identify constitutional issues and refer the case to the Constitutional Court.  Over 
sensitivity to constitutional matters after the war was certainly preferable to under 
sensitivity. 
 The third hypothesis emerges from the common law’s reliance on a system of 
precedents and the rule of stare decisis.514  Once the Supreme Court elects to decide an 
issue on constitutional grounds, its decision is the law of the land, despite subsequent 
legislative enactments.  Only when the weight of later decisions that have limited or 
distinguished an earlier opinion makes overruling the earlier decision almost inevitable, 
does the Court reverse its position.515  Changes in the composition of the Court may 
result in the Court’s greater willingness to limit the holding in an earlier decision or to 
distinguish a case before the Court from existing precedent,516 but overruling earlier 
decisions is exceptional:  “[s]tare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled 
right.”517
511 Basic Law Art. 100. 
512 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (suspending decision on 
constitutionality of a state tax pending state court resolution of applicability of the tax);  Also 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, supra note 503. 
513 Basic Law Art. 100. 
514 “To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4TH EDITION 1577 (St. Paul 
1951). 
515 South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 159, 485 U.S. at 524 acknowledges the gradual overruling of 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., supra note 164, 157 U.S. 429 (1895), with respect to the issue of 
intergovernmental tax immunity.   
516 Consider the controversial issue of abortion.  Since the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
only Justice Rehnquist, a dissenter, remains on the Court.  Yet, while the Court has limited or distinguished 
subsequent cases, it has not overruled Roe v. Wade. 
517 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, dissenting). 
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The fourth hypothesis goes to the United States’ governmental system, separation 
of powers and judicial review.  As a general policy matter, the Supreme Court avoids 
constitutional questions whenever possible.  In abstaining from deciding a constitutional 
challenge to a state tax statute until the state court interprets applicability of the tax, the 
Court writes:518
If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of 
constitutionality -- here the distribution of the taxing power as between the 
State and the Nation -- unless such adjudication is unavoidable. 
Similarly, in a case challenging a statistical sampling the Census Bureau proposed to 
apportion representation in the House of Representatives, the Court concluded that the 
Census Act did not authorize the sampling method.  Since the Court decided the case on 
statutory ground, it did not address the constitutional challenges.519  The Court’s 
reluctance to exercise judicial review of statutes is understandable as it places the Court 
into conflict with the legislature.  Since the Constitution delegates the legislative function 
to Congress, judicial review, in the Court’s tradition, remains extraordinary.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist emphasizes this point:520
Proper regard for the complex nature of our constitutional structure 
requires neither that the Judicial Branch shrink from a confrontation with 
the other two coequal branches of the Federal Government, nor that it 
hospitably accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by 
other branches of government where the claimant has not suffered 
cognizable injury. 
Separation of powers is entrenched in the American legal tradition,521 and judicial 
restraint is essential to prevent ongoing struggles between the branches of government.   
 While a similar separation of powers exists under Germany’s system, 
parliamentary systems tend to place less emphasis on separation of powers, so that 
judicial restraint may not be quite so compelling as in the United States.  For example, 
the German Constitutional Court resolved the problem that welfare recipients might 
receive more after tax income from welfare522 than some workers with income equal to 
518 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, supra note 512, 323 U.S. at 105. 
519 Doc v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999). 
520 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 
474 (1982) (plaintiff lacking standing because of no injury to itself from the purported transfer of property 
in violation of the establishment clause). 
521 Marbury v. Madison, supra note 7, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court’s power to 
review legislative acts for constitutionality).  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) 
(ruling “line item veto” to be unconstitutional, Kennedy concurring and discussing the importance of 
separation of powers). 
522 EStG §3 2. (exempting welfare payments from the income tax). 
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the amount of a welfare payment by exempting a subsistence minimum, substantially 
equivalent to public welfare assistance, from the income tax.523  In the United States, 
Congress has adjusted that problem in part with the limitation on welfare benefits in the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.524
 The fifth hypothesis may be weaker than the other hypotheses.  Under the 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court’s interest in preserving equality in taxation across 
state borders does not appear to have diminished.525  On the other hand, the Court 
increasingly tolerates small, level fees and taxes that, on equality principles, should be 
greater for taxpayers who use state resources more than others.526  The greatest number 
of constitutional tax decisions in both federal and state cases527 concentrates itself in the 
late 1920s through 1940, approximately.  As the Court matured in its approach to 
taxation, taxpayers enjoyed fewer successes, although the number of successes was quite 
small even earlier.  And the Court reversed its position on at least two issues:  retroactive 
taxation528 and federal taxation of state payments.529  Whether the German Constitutional 
Court will continue its judicial activism in taxation as its body of tax decisions grows or 
not remains an open question.   
523 BVerfGE 87, 153 (September 25, 1992, 2d Senat), supra note 123, discussed in text accompanying note 
supra 381. 
524 P.L. 104-193 (104th Cong, 1st Sess., August 22, 1996). 
525 Discussion supra Part 3D. 
526 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. PSC, supra note 280, 125 S. Ct. 2419 (2005). 
527 Data exists for the federal cases, supra notes 155-157.  The state cases are an unscientific estimate. 
528 Supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. 
529 Supra Part 3E. 
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Appendix 
A Note on Regressivity and the Income Tax Exemption/Welfare Benefit of a Subsistence 
Minimum 
 Under the German system, the combined turnover tax and income tax tends to be 
regressive at middle incomes but not at the lowest incomes.  This characteristic is easy to 
illustrate through a simplified example.  Assume that there is a flat rate turnover tax of 
16% on all goods and services, including rent, but each taxpayer is exempt from the 
income tax on an amount equal to the subsistence minimum of €100.  The statutory 
subsistence minimum is the cost per person of basic necessities – food, clothing, 
transportation and housing – grossed up to include the turnover tax that is an embedded, 
rather than an add-on, tax unlike U.S. sales taxes.  Hence basic necessities cost 
approximately €86.20 and the tax on those necessities is approximately €13.80.  On a 
pre-tax basis, the subsistence exemption amount applicable to all taxpayers is €86.20.  
Individuals whose incomes are less than €100 receive a welfare payment to increase their 
incomes to €100.  Assume further that the minimum income tax rate is 20% and, given 
the steep progressivity in rates, assume a two bracket system with the higher rate of 48% 
on incremental Euro incomes over €300. 
 All taxpayers pay €13.80 of their first €100 income in combined turnover and 
income tax.  A taxpayer with any income in excess of the subsistence amount pays at 
least 20% combined tax, even if he or she invests every Euro over €86.  Accordingly, at 
the lowest incomes, the turnover tax allows no regressivity because no taxpayer will pay 
less than 13.8% tax on each Euro.   
 However, taxpayers with incomes over €100 may experience regressivity as 
income increases.  For example, compare two taxpayers with incomes of €1000 and 
€2000 respectively who consume the first €1000 of income and invest any income over 
€1000: 
€1000 
1.  13.8% turnover in 1000       = €138 
2.  income tax @ 20% on 200  = €  40 
3.  income tax @ 48% on 700  = €336 
Total                                       =  €514 
As % of €1000 total income  = 51.4% 
€2000 
1.    Steps 1. – 2. are same =           €178 
2.   income tax @ 48% on 1700 =  €816
Total                  =  €994 
As % of €2000 total income =     49.6% 
  And this would drop to 48.3% at 
€10,000. 
 The regressivity begins to emerge at €1100 and becomes more pronounced as the 
income disparity increases. 
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